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Index of Tobacco Industry Names and Roles
Table 1. Index of tobacco company representatives and their roles
Note. Many of the tobacco company representatives listed have held numerous positions in one or more tobacco 
company or affi  liated organisations. As far as possible, the role presented in the table is the role the person was in 
at the time of the cited document/s that refer to them. The date range that the position was held is stated where 
possible. The information was gathered from the documents cited in text and the Legacy Tobacco Documents 
Library, University of California, San Francisco glossaries of names available from http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
glossaries/ 
Name Role
Alexander, Peter Nov 1990: Head of Corporate Aff airs, Rothmans of Pall Mall, Australia.
Apps, Michael Nov 1990: Western Australian State Manager, Tobacco Institute of Australia.
Bacon, David Nov 1990–1997 (approx): Head of Public Aff airs/Corporate Aff airs 
Department, British American Tobacco Company, UK.
1989–Nov 1990: Manager, Corporate Aff airs, W.D & H.O Wills (Australia) 
Limited.
Berlind, Mark Aug 1997–Aug 2000: Senior Assistant General Counsel, Worldwide 
Regulatory Aff airs, Philip Morris Management Corporation, Rye Brook, New 
York, US.
Berryman, Ron 1985–1989 (approx): Executive Offi  cer, WA branch of the Tobacco Institute 
of Australia. 
Berson, Gary Nov 1990: Solicitor, Robinson Cox.
Bible, Geoff Jun 1994–Aug 2002: Chairman of the Board & Chief Executive Offi  cer, Philip 
Morris Companies Inc.
May 1994–Jun 1994: Vice Chairman, Worldwide Tobacco, Philip Morris 
Companies Inc.
Apr 1993–May 1994: Executive Vice President, Worldwide Tobacco, Philip 
Morris Companies Inc.
Apr 1991–Apr 1993: Executive Vice President, Philip Morris International.
1987–1990: Chief Executive Offi  cer, Philip Morris International.
Feb 1984–Apr 1987: Executive Vice President, Philip Morris International.
May 1981–Feb 1984: Managing Director, Philip Morris (Australia) Limited.
1978–1981: Vice President, Philip Morris International.
Bloxcidge, John Chief Executive, INFOTAB (International Tobacco Information Centre). 
Boyse, Sharon 1991–1993: Manager of Smoking Issues, Corporate Aff airs Department, 
British American Tobacco Companies.
1986–1991: Senior Scientifi c Advisor, Research & Development Department, 
British American Tobacco Companies. 
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Name Role
Bring, Murray H. Mar 1997–Jan 2000: Attorney, Vice Chairman, External Aff airs and General 
Counsel, Board of Directors, Philip Morris.
Dec 1994–Mar 1997: Executive Vice President of External Aff airs and General 
Counsel, Philip Morris.
Sep 1988: Elected to Board of Directors.
Jul 1988–Dec 1994: Senior Vice President and General Counsel, 
Philip Morris.
Carchman, Richard Vice President, Worldwide Scientifi c Aff airs, Philip Morris Incorporated.
Davies, David Feb 1993: Vice President, Corporate Aff airs, Australia, Philip Morris 
Companies Inc. 
Dollisson, John 1983–1987: Chief Executive Offi  cer, Tobacco Institute of Australia.
Francis, Philip Director, Corporate Aff airs, Philip Morris (Australia) Limited.
Friedman, Mark Assistant General Counsel, Legal, Philip Morris Management Corporation. 
Fuller, Craig Jan 1992–Apr 1995: Senior Vice President, Corporate Aff airs, Philip Morris 
Companies Inc.
Goldberg, Henry Sep 1991–Jul 1998: Managing Director, Philip Morris International, Australia.
Goodheart, Jan Sep 1993–Apr 1996: Manager, Worldwide Regulatory Aff airs, Philip Morris 
Incorporated.
Holtzman, Alexander Apr 1974–1989: Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Philip Morris 
Companies Inc.
Hunt, Blair 1987–1989: Chief Executive Offi  cer, Tobacco Institute of Australia.
Keane, Denise Jan 1998–Dec 2000: Senior Vice President and Associate General Counsel, 
Worldwide Regulatory Aff airs, Philip Morris Management Corporation.
Macadam, Peter 1982: Chairman, British American Tobacco Industries.
Maxwell, Hamish 1984–1991: Chairman and Chief Executive Offi  cer, Philip Morris 
Companies Inc.
1983: President and Chief Operating Offi  cer, Philip Morris USA.
McGrath, Michael Public Aff airs Manager, Philip Morris (Australia) Limited. 
Miles, Michael Aug 1991–Jun 1994: Chairman and Chief Executive Offi  cer, Philip Morris 
Incorporated. 
1988–Aug 1991: President and Chief Executive Offi  cer, Kraft General Foods.
Morgan, Jim 1994–1997: President and Chief Executive Offi  cer, Philip Morris 
Incorporated.
1993–1994: Senior Vice President, Marketing, Philip Morris Incorporated.
unknown–1993: Vice President, Corporate Marketing and Planning at Philip 
Morris Companies Inc.
Mulcahy, Richard 1989–1990: Chief Executive Offi  cer, Tobacco Institute of Australia.
Murray, William Jun 1994–1995: Chairman of the Board, Philip Morris Companies Inc.
Apr 1991–May 1994: President and Chief Operating Offi  cer, Philip Morris 
Companies Inc.
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Name Role
Osdene, Thomas Apr 1984–Aug 1989: Director of Science and Technology, Philip Morris 
Incorporated.
Pottorff , Mary 1996–1998: Director, Worldwide Regulatory Aff airs, Philip Morris 
Management Corporation.
Prince, James Jun 2000: Assistant General Counsel, Philip Morris Management 
Corporation.
Riordan, Martin Manager of Corporate Aff airs, W.D & H.O Wills (Australia) Limited.
Rylander, Ragnar 1972–1999+: Scientist and covert Philip Morris consultant. 
Sheehy, Patrick Oct 1982: Chairman, British American Tobacco Industries.
1981–Oct 1982: Vice Chairman and Chairman-designate, British American 
Tobacco Industries.
Smith, Owen Jun 1987–Jul 1994: Associate General Counsel & Secretary, Philip Morris 
Management Corporation.
Snyder, Richard Dec 1983–Jan 1990: Executive Vice President, Philip Morris International, 
Australia and Asia Regions.
Solana, Richard Mar 2001: Vice President, Worldwide Scientifi c Aff airs, Philip Morris 
Incorporated. 
Sporton, Jack Philip Morris (Australia) Limited, specifi c role held in 1983-1984 unknown.
Staunton, Donna Nov 1993–Feb 1995: Chief Executive Offi  cer, Tobacco Institute of Australia.
Steer, David Nov 1990: State Manager, Philip Morris (Australia) Limited.
Wall, Charles Jun 1990–Dec 1994: Vice President and Associate General Counsel, 
Corporate Legal Department, Philip Morris Companies Inc.
Wall, Ian Nov 1990: Corporate Aff airs Manager, Philip Morris (Australia) Limited.
Webb, William From Aug 2002: Consultant to the Altria Group.
Aug 2001–Aug 2002: Chief Operating Offi  cer and Vice Chairman of the 
Board, Philip Morris Incorporated.
March 1997–Aug 2002: Chief Operating Offi  cer, Philip Morris Incorporated.
Jun 1993–1996: President and Chief Executive Offi  cer, Philip Morris 
International.
1990: President, Philip Morris Asia/Pacifi c.
Nov 1987–Jun 1993: Executive Vice President, Philip Morris International 
(responsible for Australia and Asia).
1984–1987: Managing Director, Philip Morris (Australia) Limited.
Whist, Andrew Jan 1981– Mar 1987: Vice President, Corporate Aff airs, Philip Morris 
International.
White, Nerida Corporate Communications Manager, Philip Morris (Australia) Limited.
Wilson, Brian T. Attorney; Clayton Utz, Australian Counsel for Philip Morris and the Tobacco 
Institute.
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Name Role
Windholz, Eric Sep 2000–Jan 2001: Attorney; Corporate Aff airs, Philip Morris (Australia) 
Limited.
Jan 1997–Sep 2000: Assistant General Counsel, Worldwide Regulatory 
Aff airs, Philip Morris Management Corporation.
Winokur, Matt Jul 1994–Dec 1994: Director, Corporate Scientifi c Aff airs, Philip Morris 
Management Corporation.
Aug 1993–Jun 1994: Director, European/Worldwide Regulatory Aff airs, 
Philip Morris Incorporated.
Mar 1991–Jul 1993: Director, Corporate Aff airs, Philip Morris International.
Zahn, Leonard S. Leonard Zahn & Associates, Inc., public relations company for the Council for 
Tobacco Research created by Philip Morris.
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Foreword
It would be hard to fi nd somewhere more remote from the centre of the international tobacco industry than 
Western Australia. The international tobacco companies active in Australia are controlled from North America   
and the United Kingdom. One might assume that a state with some two million inhabitants in a sparsely 
populated country would barely appear on the radar of the tobacco industry’s global leaders.
Western Australia has, however, also been at the forefront of tobacco control action in Australia and 
internationally, especially since the fi rst major eff orts to ban tobacco advertising in the early 1980s. The State 
has benefi ted over the years from strong coalitions - of health organisations, between health groups and 
others concerned for the public health, inside government, and between governments and non-government 
organisations. Action has been incremental, with important developments occurring under governments of  
either political persuasion.
Since millions of tobacco industry documents became available online following the Master Settlement 
Agreement of 1998, a substantial literature has enabled tobacco control advocates and others to learn much 
about the tobacco industry and its operations. Many of the deepest secrets of the industry have been laid bare. 
We are now vastly better informed about tobacco industry concerns, strategies and tactics. We have learned that 
almost all the suspicions we had about the industry’s cynicism and ruthless approach were justifi ed. We know 
what they knew and how they tried to deny or cover up both the dangers of smoking and the truth about their 
own activities. Analyses of tobacco industry internal documents show that their interests and activities have 
ranged from health matters to industry involvement in areas such as smuggling.
Despite this cornucopia of information, the major focus of document-based research and publications has 
inevitably been on the United States and other countries where the industry is either located or has been seen     
as focussing its interests. It is, however, clear that this is a global industry with global concerns, and that its 
fi nancial well-being rests on the profi tability of operations around the world.
The WA Tobacco Document Searching Program was established with support from Healthway, the Health 
Promotion Foundation of Western Australia, to research and identify tobacco industry documents as they apply 
particularly to Western Australia. The Program has identifi ed a wide range of issues and concerns that have 
enabled us to learn much more about the way the industry works in Australia as well as elsewhere.
This monograph focuses very specifi cally on the way in which Western Australia is perceived by the international 
tobacco industry. It is clear that Western Australia was not simply a remote part of the empire. 
Tobacco company executives at the most senior levels were kept fully and regularly informed about 
developments in Western Australia, not just in their head offi  ces in Australia but in New York and London.
They received regular updates, and were kept posted, often in fi ne detail, about developments in relation to 
policies, governmental actions, media, health organisations and even individuals.
They took a close interest not only in developments within the State, but in Western Australia’s infl uence on 
national agendas, for example through the Australian Health Ministers’ Council and the Ministerial Council on 
Drug Strategy.
The tobacco companies were interested in high-profi le developments – such as attempts to ban tobacco 
advertising and sponsorship or the Burswood Casino case (see monograph section on the Burswood International 
Resort Casino for details of the case), but also in developments that might have seemed of minor import, such as 
the listing of cancer as a notifi able disease. The industry carefully monitored not only political developments, but 
events and activities across the health arena.
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Some of the comments and events reported to the industry’s global leaders might be equally well placed in a 
comedy program, for example the 1980s comments of the Western Australian Tobacco Institute Executive Offi  cer 
Ron Berryman, that, “Irrespective of how many children take up smoking in a year, no one is immortal – everyone 
dies sooner or later”, and, in response to the allegation that cigarettes are a cause of cancer, “So are potatoes. 
Tobacco is in the same family. You inhale the fumes of potatoes when you are cooking them”. 
But other aspects of the industry’s activities border on the sinister. As this report documents, Professor Ragnar 
Rylander, from the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, who both spent a sabbatical month at The University of 
Western Australia in 1988, and was viewed in good faith by Western Australian scientists as a respected colleague, 
was essentially a tobacco industry spy, with a generously-funded consultancy, sending back secret reports to the 
Philip Morris company in New York on tobacco control developments within Western Australia.
This monograph provides a record of the international tobacco industry’s interests in Western Australia over more 
than three decades. From it we learn much more than simply what the industry did and where its concerns lay. 
We learn about past strategies and more current concerns, about the tactics adopted by the industry, and about 
tobacco control measures most likely to cause concern to the major companies as having potential for real impact 
on smoking in both adults and children.
I would like to thank Julia Staff ord, who worked long and hard to seek out the relevant documents, ensuring 
that we have access to important information about Western Australia, presented in a readable and informative 
manner.
We can learn much from the past, but the information in this monograph will also help us to plan for more 
eff ective control strategies in the future. We have also learned that the decisions taken about tobacco company 
activities in Western Australia are not made here: they are made in New York and London. We must therefore 
ensure that as well as pressing for eff ective action within this state and nationally, we keep a very close watch on 
what the tobacco companies do in the countries where they are based. They are certainly keeping watch on us.
Mike Daube
Professor of Health Policy, Curtin University of Technology
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1.0 Introduction
The purposes of this monograph are to document the nature and extent of information international tobacco 
companies retained regarding Western Australia (WA), and to develop an understanding of why the international 
tobacco companies have been interested specifi cally in WA. This information can be used to inform tobacco 
control strategies and the work of organisations concerned with reducing smoking and countering the activities 
of the tobacco industry. 
Preliminary searches of the online tobacco industry document archives available due to United States (US) 
litigation and the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) uncovered a wide range of international tobacco 
company documents, particularly from the US, which referred to WA. The WA-specifi c content of these documents 
indicates that US and other international tobacco companies and executives have maintained a high level 
of interest in WA, particularly at times when action that might have threatened their interests was under 
consideration. 
WA has been and continues to be home to numerous champions of public health who have historically 
contributed to WA being one of the leading states in terms of public health initiatives.1 Vocal public health 
and tobacco control advocates inside and outside government have devoted signifi cant time and energy to 
maintaining the visibility of tobacco control on government agendas and raising awareness of the dangers of 
smoking in the community, as well as playing a signifi cant role in tobacco control developments nationally and 
internationally. WA Health Ministers and Premiers have at times also championed tobacco control. 
Tobacco control advocates face similar challenges to others tackling alcohol, obesity or other issues which bring 
them into confl ict with powerful industries with vested interests that do not always support health objectives. 
The related industry’s fi nancial resources are often far weightier than those of the health organisations calling for 
change in the interest of public health. 
The budget allocations for tobacco control and prevention by the WA government and health organisations active 
in WA are vastly outweighed by the funds available to the tobacco companies to counteract tobacco control 
initiatives. However, as has been shown with the success of the reduction in smoking prevalence in Australia, 
with the exception of the Indigenous Australian population whose smoking prevalence has remained relatively 
unchanged,2 the amount of money dedicated to addressing a social or health issue need not limit the impact of 
work in that area. Tobacco control advocacy and legislation have proven successful in WA to the extent that the 
major tobacco companies have felt threatened by individuals and organisations in WA which are modestly-funded 
yet wield strong and energetic advocacy resources. 
Over the last four decades, signifi cant tobacco control initiatives have been introduced in WA at the state level or 
as part of national moves; and each can be expected to have been the target of considerable opposition by the 
tobacco industry and their allies. These include3, 4:
• Substantial tax increases on cigarettes
• Removal of the distribution of free cigarette samples and competitions involving cigarettes 
• Tougher penalties for selling cigarettes to minors
• Licensing of tobacco retailers
• Restrictions on point of sale marketing 
• Ban on tobacco company advertising and sponsorship
• Establishment of the WA Health Promotion Foundation (Healthway)
• Legislation introduced to ban smoking in enclosed public places 
• Incremental restrictions on smoking in the Burswood International Resort Casino (BIRC)
• Implementation of smoke-free clubs and pubs
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• Public education campaigns
• Mandated health warnings on cigarette packets
• Labelling donations from the tobacco industry as unethical and socially undesirable 
Legislation in recent years shows that WA governments have been willing to act, with continuing public support, 
so as to further regulate tobacco promotion, sales and smoking in the presence of others.5 The WA government’s 
commitment to tobacco control has been recognised over time by the Australian Medical Association (AMA) and 
the Australian Council on Smoking and Health (ACOSH) through its high ratings in National Tobacco Scoreboards.6-
8 WA has been rated as having the most eff ective tobacco control initiatives over several of the years in which the 
Scoreboard has been in existence.
It is not argued that WA was ever the international tobacco industry’s biggest or only threat, or the only region to 
be home to vocal and persistent tobacco control advocates. However, the internal industry documents refl ect that 
WA was, and continues to be, a concerning market for the tobacco industry. It can be expected that companies 
will monitor product sales and issues potentially impacting sales in all areas they are sold. Therefore, it is not 
surprising in itself that information is held on WA. The interest of the study relates to the nature and extent of the 
information (i.e., what issues are discussed), how much information (i.e., level of detail), and the people involved 
(i.e., which tobacco company representatives and specifi c WA people are mentioned). 
Local cigarette manufacturers and distributers are members of transnational corporate families.9 In 1954, Philip 
Morris (Australia) Limited (PML) was established as Philip Morris’s (PM) fi rst major affi  liate outside the US10 and was 
overseen by Philip Morris International (PMI).9 W.D. & H.O. Wills (Wills Australia) was the Australian subsidiary of the 
British American Tobacco (BAT) Group.9 R.J. Reynolds distributed tobacco products in Australia. Rothmans of Pall 
Mall also operate in Australia; however, few industry documents are available from R.J. Reynolds because it was 
not involved in the US MSA.9
Numerous organisations have existed over the years with the purpose of gathering intelligence on regional 
issues for use by international tobacco companies. The International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI) was 
established in the late 1970s and renamed INFOTAB (the English version of the full title is International Tobacco 
Information Center) in 1981.11, 12 The close of INFOTAB in 1990-91 saw Shook, Hardy & Bacon (SHB), a law fi rm 
which represented tobacco companies, take over INFOTAB’s former role of distributing detailed summaries of 
worldwide issues.11 The media monitoring role of SHB coincided with the increasing legal involvement of SHB in 
tobacco industry matters during the 1990s.11 The Tobacco Documentation Center (TDC) later took over the role 
of INFOTAB.13 
Affi  liates and front groups for the tobacco industry have existed in Australia for decades. The Tobacco Institute 
of Australia (TIA) was established in Sydney in 1978 as a National Manufacturers Association (NMA) to 
represent joint industry interests.11 The TIA provided a link between local and international companies and was 
signifi cantly supported by INFOTAB, the US Tobacco Institute (USTI) and later by SHB.11 The information sent 
by these organisations ensured the Australian industry was kept up to date on research, policy, litigation and 
global industry issues.11 Australian companies closely involved with the TIA acted as a medium for the further 
dissemination of this information.11 The TIA actively sought people holding views inline with the tobacco 
industry’s public positions to further their strategy of perpetuating deception on smoking issues.11 This role of the 
TIA was supported by their global informants including the USTI and INFOTAB.11
The WA Executive Offi  cer of the TIA in the 1980s was Ron Berryman. During this period Berryman became the 
Australian-based tobacco industry spokesperson most often quoted in WA media activities which were monitored 
internationally. Berryman features in the tobacco industry documents available in the online archives with 
comments such as:
• Berryman, representing the TIA, was quoted in an article in The West Australian on 26 January 1985 as saying, 
“WA’s laws controlling tobacco sales to minors are totally inadequate”.14 
Western Australia and the international tobacco industry
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• In an ‘Infotopics’ report summarising an article from The West Australian on 15 January 1987, Berryman 
questioned the results of a survey commissioned by ACOSH regarding the health risk of environmental 
tobacco smoke (ETS) to non-smokers, saying that the results “frighten non-smokers into believing their health 
was at risk”.15 
• In 1989 Berryman said, “irrespective of how many children take up smoking in a year, no-one’s immortal - 
everyone dies sooner or later”.16 
• In response to the allegation that cigarettes are a cause of cancer, in 1989 Berryman said: “So are potatoes. 
Tobacco is in the same family. You inhale the fumes of potatoes when you’re cooking them”.16 
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2.0 Method
Results for this study were obtained by searching tobacco industry document archives available online as 
a requirement of the 1998 MSA. A systematic search of the documents was conducted in accordance with 
established guidelines.17, 18 Primary keywords were entered into the document search engines and included 
‘Western Australia’, ‘Perth’, names of people involved in health or government in WA (for example, Health Minister 
Graham Kierath) and names of WA health organisations (for example, Australian Council on Smoking and Health, 
Cancer Council WA, National Heart Foundation). Secondary searches were conducted to clarify or expand on 
information contained in documents retrieved in the primary search and to fi nd attachments to retrieved 
documents. Other information sources including journal articles, Hansard Parliamentary Debates and published 
reports were consulted to clarify and confi rm information contained in the tobacco industry documents and to 
document key achievements in tobacco control. The key tobacco industry document archives used in this study 
include: Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, the Philip Morris Document Site and the British American Tobacco 
Documents Archive. 
Document searching was carried out between January and November 2008. Documents were selected if they 
referred specifi cally to WA and there was reason to believe the document had been viewed by international 
tobacco company representatives (e.g., international author, recipient, fax mark, document stamped with 
international offi  ce stamp). Documents referring to Australia in a general sense were most often not selected 
for inclusion in the study, unless they contained information specifi c to WA or clarifi ed information contained in 
other documents. In all, 267 documents were identifi ed as being relevant for this study and have been included 
in the monograph. Retrieved documents were grouped into themes and chronologically ordered. Key themes 
and issues relating to WA were identifi ed (e.g., health warnings, tax increases, proposed legislation). Information 
associated with the BIRC case was taken from a previous study conducted by the authors [Bond, Staff ord & Daube 
in preparation]. 
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3.0 Results
Tobacco document research is limited to the industry documents made available through the document 
discovery process specifi ed in the MSA.17, 18 Access to the documents is further limited to the documents loaded 
onto the online document archives. Many of the major transnational tobacco companies were required by the 
MSA to make their internal documents publicly available. These included Philip Morris Incorporated (PM USA), 
BAT, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Lorillard Tobacco Company, 
and the American Tobacco Company.17 Not all of the tobacco companies were involved in the MSA, for example 
Imperial Tobacco. 
3.1 Tobacco Industry Monitoring of Western Australia
The tobacco industry document archives contain thousands of documents that indicate the tobacco companies 
monitored WA in relation to a wide range of tobacco issues. The range of media monitoring services the tobacco 
companies accessed in order to keep informed about issues potentially aff ecting the sale and consumption of 
tobacco in WA can be identifi ed in the documents. 
Specifi c departments of the tobacco companies themselves were responsible for media monitoring; for example, 
the Consumer and Regulatory Aff airs (CORA) departments of Wills Australia and BAT produced ‘BATCo Press 
Cuttings’19 and the ‘Worldwide Regulatory Aff airs’ (WRA) department of PM.20 
The media monitoring services and publications noted in this section were retrieved from the document archives 
in searches relating to WA. Other services not mentioned here may also have been used by the tobacco industry; 
however, they were beyond the scope of this study. 
3.1.1 Australian Media Monitoring Services
Australian-based media monitoring services were contracted by the tobacco industry to produce reports 
focussing specifi cally on Australian media. The Australian-based media monitoring reports were not necessarily 
sent to the international tobacco industry; however, they do represent the industry’s use of media monitoring 
services covering WA. 
Tobacco companies received media monitoring reports from NJP News Express, the media monitoring service 
of company Neville Jeff ress/Pidler Pty Ltd.21 Media monitoring reports from NJP News Express covered litigation 
involving tobacco companies.22 NJP News Express later changed its name to Media Monitors Australia23 and 
continued to provide media monitoring services under the new name.24 Press clippings distributed by Media 
Monitors included articles tracking the media campaigning and passage of the 1983 Bill to ban tobacco 
advertising and sponsorship.25, 26 
Croll Communications Pty Ltd produced the radio monitoring publication ‘Croll’s Monitoring Australia’.27 Croll’s 
monitoring role included distributing the transcript of a radio interview regarding listing nicotine as a poison.28 
Rehame Australia Monitoring Services Pty Ltd produced the monitoring report ‘Newslines’29 and media 
transcripts30 until Rehame was acquired by Media Monitors in 2006.31 Rehame ‘Newslines’ publications retrieved 
from the document archives were addressed to Reg Hodgson, Corporate Aff airs Manager PML29 and Donina Asera 
of PML.32 
Other media monitoring publications retrieved from the document archives include a ‘Monitoring Report’ 
produced by ‘Monitoring Perth Media’ in September 1984 which summarised news reports that the visiting 
director of Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) Scotland questioned a survey showing the WA public supported 
tobacco advertising.33 A 1984 transcript of Perth Channel 7 interview (‘State Aff air’) between Howard Sattler, Peter 
Taylor (BBC journalist and author) and Duncan Fairweather (spokesman for AMATIL) is held on the archives.34 
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The TIA and later the Tobacco Information Centre Inc produced the ‘Australian Issues Media Surveillance’ and 
‘Australian Issues Media Summary’ which provided “a daily Australia-wide summary of major issues relevant to the 
tobacco industry”.35 These reports retrieved between August 1998 and January 2000 covered media reports on 
measures to prevent youth smoking,35 the loosening of indoor smoking restrictions36 and the plan to introduce 
graphic health warnings on cigarette packs.37 
3.1.2 International Media Monitoring Services
Law fi rms contracted by the tobacco industry also produced comprehensive media monitoring bulletins for 
their clients. SHB’s comprehensive publications were titled ‘Current Regulatory Developments Report’ and were 
distributed to the TIA and tobacco companies fortnightly.38, 39 Similarly, another tobacco industry law fi rm, Lovell 
White Durrant (LWD) based in London, produced the ‘Tobacco Bulletin’ updating the industry on tobacco-related 
news events around the world.40 
International organisations affi  liated with the tobacco industry further played a signifi cant role in distributing 
detailed summaries of international media to tobacco companies. The Tobacco Merchants Association (TMA) 
produced an ‘Executive Summary’ and ‘World Alert’ on tobacco related issues. Campbell-Johnson Limited, a British 
public aff airs fi rm contracted by BAT,41 compiled a “daily synopsis of press, radio and television coverage”.42
INFOTAB, and then the TDC, produced and distributed the monthly media monitoring publication ‘Infotopics’ to 
the TIA and tobacco companies. ‘Infotopics’ presented abstracts of publicly available information.12, 43 Other TDC 
media summary publications included ‘INFOGRAM’ which reported on “programmes of strategies furthering the 
industries objectives or forestalling anti-smoking actions”,12 ‘Fiscal Bulletin’,44 ‘TDC Newsround’,45 ‘Smoking Issues 
Status Book’46 and the ‘TDC News Database’ (see Figure 1).47 
The monitoring services were distributed as often as daily and weekly and were compiled using information 
available in the public domain (e.g., newspapers, press releases, radio).43 Press clippings referring to WA were 
primarily taken from The West Australian newspaper, supplemented by The Australian newspaper, The Sunday 
Times and The Daily News (until it ceased publication in 1990). These newspapers provided the tobacco industry 
with a source from which to identify topical issues relevant to WA. International newspaper articles reporting 
on WA issues and events, for example from the Daily Telegraph (UK), were also included in media monitoring 
reports.42 The frequency of distribution and range of media monitoring services feeding this information to the 
tobacco companies points to the importance of these resources. 
Topics and issues relating to WA covered in the media monitoring include: 
• Tobacco product advertising and sponsorship bans42 
• Healthway, the Western Australian Health Promotion Foundation48, 49 
• Health warnings and pack labelling37
• Indoor smoking restrictions50
• Listing nicotine as a poison51
• Litigation against the tobacco industry (e.g., BIRC case)52
• Public Education campaigns19
• WA health organisations36
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Figure 1. Example of media monitoring bulletin45
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3.1.3 Reasons for Media Monitoring 
Local media monitoring would have been carried out for several reasons. Media monitoring enabled the 
identifi cation of tobacco industry allies and sympathetic journalists.11 As one example, the industry document 
archives hold an article by journalist Len Findlay in The West Australian sympathetic to the tobacco industry 
(28 September 1993).53 The article reported on the group of European academics known as ARISE, the Association 
for Research Into Substance Enjoyment. Findlay attacks the “wowsers…who want to live our lives for us” and 
writes “If some people want to smoke their way to their own heaven or hell, that is their responsibility”.53 Articles 
such as Findlay’s are seen as assisting in creating the ‘balance’ of views in public media the tobacco industry 
encourage.54 
The monitoring of WA media is part of global monitoring processes and day-to-day standard tobacco industry 
activities in major markets. Signifi cant resources are invested in monitoring activities because the companies 
need to be aware of issues as they arise or are likely to arise in order to be ahead of the game internationally. It 
is fundamentally important for tobacco companies to keep close tabs on world issues and be alert to any trends 
that impact on the tobacco industry as these have the potential to spread within a country and across the world 
(domino eff ect). The transnational nature of the major tobacco companies requires a comprehensive monitoring 
system to keep informed about developments anywhere in the world in order to respond as necessary for the 
tobacco business to continue to grow. Individual tobacco companies need to protect their own interests, as 
well as the interests of the industry as a whole. The tobacco industry are also interested in specifi c issues likely 
to impact on their industry (e.g., advertising bans). Tobacco companies also need to keep informed about the 
activities and ideas being discussed by individuals working in tobacco control to enable tobacco companies to 
prepare and respond in line with their interests. 
Internal tobacco company strategic plans provide an insight into their use of media monitoring in their own 
words. A PM strategic plan from December 1996 coordinated between PM USA, PMI, WRA, Corporate Aff airs and 
Worldwide Operations and Technology provides the company’s worldwide objectives and strategies for ensuring 
accommodation policies for smokers in various facilities rather than smoke-free regulations.55 The fi rst objective 
of the plan was to “Ensure reasonable and rational outcomes of regulatory and quasi-regulatory initiatives”. The 
strategies outlined to achieve this suggest reasons behind tobacco industry media monitoring regarding one 
specifi c issue, ETS55: 
• “Address proposed regulatory and scientifi c initiatives”
• “Identify and address emerging regulatory initiatives”
• “Contribute to the debate on ETS and related scientifi c issues”
• “Identify and respond to new publications and scientifi c developments”
• “Identify emerging claims and contribute to the development of response strategies”
• “Participate in industry-wide scientifi c initiatives as appropriate to ensure coordination and effi  cient use 
of resources”
The plan outlined PM’s aim to “Communicate our views, putting the issue into perspective with opinion leaders 
and the public and positioning PM as a reasonable partner in the decision-making process” [Bates: 2065562306-
2391].55 The media are a signifi cant resource through which the tobacco industry is made aware of “proposed” or 
“emerging” initiatives and “new publications and scientifi c developments”.55 A comprehensive understanding of 
media coverage of tobacco issues would also assist the tobacco industry to publicly contribute to the tobacco 
issue debate. 
A research proposal published in September 1998 by the CORA function of Wills Australia provides further 
insight into the tobacco industry’s interest in media monitoring.56 The ‘Issues Tracking Study’ had the objective of 
assessing widely held community attitudes toward smoking, tobacco companies and tobacco industry regulation. 
The study aimed to establish the extent to which public opinion was infl uenced by media coverage of tobacco 
industry issues.56 The study proposed to identify issues which received extensive media coverage at a national or 
state level and use survey data to determine whether a corresponding shift in public opinion could be detected. 
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While not itself an international tobacco industry document, this research proposal illustrates an intended use for 
Australian media monitoring, the results of which would be of interest to international industry executives.
3.1.4 Tobacco Industry Documents Referring to WA
A range of documents relating to WA have been retrieved from the industry archives. It is signifi cant to note the 
diff erent types of documents and the issues covered in each. Table 2 outlines the types of industry documents and 
the issues covered in documents retrieved which refer to WA. As a cautionary note, the retrieved documents are 
likely to be only a sample of all the industry documents relating to WA which have ever existed. The documents 
outlined in the table are subject to the limitations of the study outlined in this report and they may not all be 
international documents (particularly the Australian-based media monitoring summaries and the tobacco control 
publications).
In tobacco document research, some of the most interesting insights into the tobacco industry can be found in 
memos and letters sent between tobacco industry representatives. Internal tobacco industry documents such as 
these would never have been available to tobacco control researchers had it not been for the MSA. For the current 
study, a signifi cant number of inter-offi  ce memos from PML are available and off er an interesting insight into the 
company’s interest in WA.
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Table 2. Issues covered in international tobacco industry documents referring to WA 
Type of document Issues covered
International media monitoring 
summaries* 
• Cancer as a notifi able disease
• Tobacco advertising and sponsorship and proposed bans 
• Sports sponsorship 
• Government anti-smoking campaign 
• WA research on youth smoking
• Generic packaging 
• Nicotine poisons listing
• Litigation involving tobacco industry or violations of smoke-free 
regulations
• Recovery of health care costs
• Workplace smoking regulations
• AHA views on ETS and smoke-free public places
• BIRC smoking regulations and staff  testing of ETS exposure
• Smoke-free regulations
• AMA tobacco scoreboard
• Smoker demographics
• Political monitoring
• Political donations from tobacco companies
• Outdoor smoking restrictions
• Smoking in cars with children 
• Planned tobacco control initiatives 
• Graphic health warnings 
• Quit campaign
• WAHA links with the tobacco industry
• Cigarette ingredients disclosure
• Air quality testing and ETS
• Proposed cigarette vending machine ban
• Smokers’ rights campaign
Australian-based media monitoring 
summaries**
• Litigation involving tobacco companies 
• Nicotine poisons listing
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Interoffi  ce memos or correspondence • Campaign against an increase to taxation on tobacco products
• Legislation to ban advertising and sponsorship (including progress 
through parliament)
• Campaign against State Licence Fee increase
• Government anti-smoking campaigns
• Product sales
• Australian cigarette market research 
• Political monitoring
• Tobacco industry funded research
• Health warning label regulations
• WA Department of Health public education campaign
• Heart Foundation of WA youth smoking prevention program
• WA tobacco control legislation
• Nicotine poisons listing
• Ragnar Rylander’s PM consultancy activities
• WA ETS Taskforce 
• ACOSH 10-point plan1∗ 
• Tobacco control conference speakers 
• Smoke-free regulations
• Minors’ access to cigarettes
• Health warnings on movies featuring smoking




• AHA views on ETS and smoke-free public places
• Tobacco document destruction
• ‘Light’ and ‘mild’ cigarettes
Letters • Health warning label regulations 
• Public education campaigns by the WA Department of Health
• ETS and smoke-free public places
• Ragnar Rylander’s connection to PM
• Tobacco Institute of Australia’s feature in the Australian Women’s 
Weekly magazine
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Reports • Advertising and sponsorship ban
• Political monitoring
• Youth smoking prevention
• Ragnar Rylander’s trip reports
• Anti-smoking legislation
• Nicotine poisons listing
• Research on children’s attitudes to cigarette advertising by the 
Heart Foundation of WA and the University of WA
• ETS/accommodation policies
Strategic plans •  PM company activities
Tobacco control publications*** • Advertising and youth
• 7th World Conference on Tobacco and Health
• AMA public education campaign regarding passive smoking
• Health warning label regulations
• Quit campaign
• Litigation
• Tobacco industry activities
• Sports sponsorship 
• Nicotine poisons listing 
• Passive smoking summit 
• British Medical Journal paper on advertising ban legislation
Other **** • Public education campaigns
                                                                                                             
*  Including TDC publications (INFOGRAM), SHB and LWD publications, Campbell-Johnson Limited, BAT Tobacco Bulletin. 
**  Including NJP News Express, Croll’s Monitoring Australia, Rehame publications, Media monitors, and Tobacco Information Centre Inc 
publications. 
***  Including conference papers, health organisation newsletters (e.g., ACOSH) and media releases.
**** Including magazine articles. 
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3.2 The Beginning of Big Tobacco’s Interest in WA
Arranging the tobacco industry documents into chronological order allowed issue-specifi c groupings to emerge 
from the available industry documents referring to WA. The groupings refl ect the heightened media coverage 
and industry interest in tobacco issues present in WA at various times. The number of documents available 
allows researchers to piece together a reasonably comprehensive history of tobacco control in WA and uncover a 
unique insight into the tobacco industry’s response to individuals, organisations and initiatives concerned about 
smoking-caused harm in the WA population. 
One of the earliest media monitoring references to WA identifi ed in the industry documents was a copy of 
a Globe Magazine article from July 1957 titled “The Smoking Habit: International Enigma”.57 The article is a 
compilation of reports of “smoking habits and practices” from various countries including Australia. The report 
outlined a recent recommendation made by the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council to 
Australian governments calling for a public anti-smoking campaign. The report stated, “So far, however, only 
Western Australia has taken the warning seriously. There the heads of the public health department publicly 
renounced smoking as the state government launched a poster campaign proclaiming: ‘If you smoke - cut down; 
if you haven’t taken it up yet – don’t.’” At the time in Western Australia, Dr. Linley Henzell was Commissioner 
of Public Health (1950-1962) and Emil Nulsen was Health Minister (1953-1958) under the Albert Hawke Labor 
government.58 While the 1957 campaign bears little comparison with those of today, the move showed that WA 
decision makers were prepared to act on the evidence of health risks which was starting to build at the time, 
perhaps in advance of their Eastern States counterparts. 
More frequent references to WA appeared during the 1970s, including a collection of newspaper clippings held 
in the PM archives from March 1975 editions of The West Australian, Weekend News and the Sunday Times.59 The 
articles reported on the initiative of the Community Recreation Council of WA to boycott sporting events that 
were fi nancially supported by tobacco companies.59 These articles present early evidence of the movement in 
WA to end tobacco industry sponsorship of sporting events; a theme which would be a focus of tobacco industry 
monitoring of WA over the decades to follow.
The PML Five Year Management Plan 1977-1981 provides a detailed overview of PML’s strengths, threats and 
opportunities in the Australian cigarette market.60 The distribution list indicates the 187 page plan was sent to PMI 
executives based in the New York offi  ce including Hamish Maxwell (Executive Vice President 1975-1977 and Board 
of Directors 1974-1991, PM USA). The plan was published soon after WA introduced State Licence Fees (SLF) on 
1 January 1976, following similar legislation in other states. The PML plan provides evidence that the combined 
eff orts of Australia’s tobacco control forces were being felt by the industry and were being monitored closely. 
With reference to Australia, the report reads, “The anti-smoking lobby continued to command extensive media 
coverage. There is continuing controversy over the involvement of cigarette companies in sporting promotions, 
and moves to ban smoking in public places are obtaining increased publicity”.60 Regarding taxes on tobacco 
products, the plan asserts: “Naturally all eff orts must be made to encourage Governments to restrain their taxation 
of the industry”.60 Under the title ‘Smoking and Health: Problem’, the extension of health warning requirements, 
restrictions on smoking in public places and foreseeable restrictions on use of media for advertising in Australia 
are outlined.60 
PML’s planned response to these pressures was to:
“…prevent the anti-smoking lobby making further inroads in this direction. In this regard the Australian 
industry has formed the most united and concerted force of any comparable Western Nation and have, 
under the circumstances, been quite successful in delaying the inevitable restrictions on the industry’s 
marketing practices”.60 
The plan featured an analysis of PM product sales from which the company drew the conclusion: “There is an 
historic problem in the imbalance of Company sales by state. Great potential is evident in New South Wales, 
Queensland and Western Australia”.60 An objective of the PM Sales Department for the year was “To maintain the 
optimum Community Relations fi eld force”.60 This included creating a new position for a representative in WA “due 
to increased promotional activity”.60 
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Tobacco industry attention focussed on WA when Perth hosted the 7th World Conference on Smoking and Health 
in 1990. The ideas and activities of WA, Australian and international tobacco control researchers and activists 
were closely monitored by the tobacco industry despite tobacco company representatives being specifi cally 
excluded from the conference. Industry interest in the conference is discussed further in the section on Health 
Organisations.
3.3 Regulation and Legislation
3.3.1 Cancer Listed as a Notifi able Disease
The reporting of new cases of cancer to the WA Department of Health has been a legal requirement under the 
Health Act since 1981.61 On 14 August 1981 PM received notifi cation from ‘Corporate Aff airs Weekly Summary’ 
that as of 1 August that year, cancer was to be listed as a notifi able disease in WA.62 Pathologists and radiation 
oncologists were required from that date to report patient details to be recorded on the WA Cancer Registry. 
Cancer Registry data gathered at the state and national level for tobacco-related cancers have since been used 
in research63 and advocacy campaigns to draw attention to the number of Western Australians affl  icted with 
cancer believed to be caused by smoking. WA epidemiologists, notably Professor Bruce Armstrong, Professor 
D’Arcy Holman and Professor Konrad Jamrozik, have taken on the challenge of fi nding new and striking ways of 
presenting the evidence on the dangers of smoking to capture the attention of the public and decision makers 
and bring a sense of urgency to the issue. With a similar aim, Professor Mike Daube coined the term ‘creative 
epidemiology’ to refer to the art of presenting epidemiological results in forms accessible to everyone.4, 41 The WA 
Cancer Registry has allowed the issue of smoking-caused cancer to be localised and government representatives 
to act on local information from their jurisdiction. 
3.3.2 Legislative Attempts to Ban Tobacco Advertising and Sponsorship
In August 1979, Brian Simpson, TIA Director, wrote a letter to Horace Kornegay, President of the Tobacco Institute 
based in Washington D.C. regarding two recent articles published in The West Australian which had “triggered a 
considerable amount of activity for the Institute in defending our position in the areas of advertising bans and 
sporting sponsorships”.64 The articles attached to the letter reported on calls by the WA branch of the AMA to 
ban tobacco advertising and sporting sponsorship by tobacco companies.65-68 Simpson stated: “We immediately 
took a task force to Perth in an endeavour to reduce the eff ect of the A.M.A.’s case for bans and had extensive 
discussions with the appropriate Government Departments, the newspaper and sporting organisations who 
receive sponsorships”.64
In 1982, ACOSH drafted the Smoking and Tobacco Products Advertisements Bill which proposed to ban tobacco 
product advertising.69, 70 Dr Thomas Dadour, a General Practitioner and member of the Liberal Party, introduced 
the proposed legislation as a private members Bill into WA parliament.69, 70
Prior to the introduction of the Bill to parliament, internal communications between PM executives illustrate the 
extent of their concerns about the proposed legislation. Michael McGrath (Public Aff airs Manager, PML) sent a 
memo in May 1981 to Geoff  Bible (Managing Director, PML 1981-1983) titled “Major issues confronting PMA [Philip 
Morris Australia]” which refers to ACOSH’s 1982 legislative attempt.71 Regarding advertising of tobacco products, 
McGrath lists the “agitation for a total ban” by ACOSH in WA as one of the major issues PM is to confront. McGrath 
notes that the eff orts by ACOSH “for a total ban are unlikely to succeed, but they add pressure to moves against 
sponsorship and cinema”.71 
The memo also refers to the enquiry into sporting sponsorship by the Sub-Committee of Health Administrators 
which was due to report to the Health Ministers later that year.71 PM anticipated the outcome to include 
recommendations to amend the Broadcasting & Television Act, or an extension of the Voluntary Code. PM’s allies 
in the sport industry lobbied government Ministers at the state and federal level, assisting PM to protect their 
fi nancial interests in sports sponsorship. This lobbying strategy would include creation of a signifi cant pool of 
credible sportspeople to represent industry views to politicians and the media. A handwritten notation on the 
memo indicated that a copy was sent to Alexander Holtzman (PM USA Assistant General Counsel 1975-85).
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BAT staff  were also aware of the legislative attempt in WA. A synopsis of media coverage provided to BAT 
by Campbell-Johnson Limited on 29 October 1982 contained an extract from a Daily Telegraph (UK edition) 
newspaper article titled “Tobacco companies worried”.42 It outlined the growing concern of British tobacco 
companies over the proposed legislation in WA to ban tobacco advertising. A tobacco industry spokesman said: 
“We sponsor everything from darts to grand opera, yet the anti-smoking lobby is always trying to stop us. We 
benefi t hundreds of thousands of people who do not, and never will, smoke. Yet the militants within the anti-
smoking lobby do not want us to help sport and culture. It may seem strange to some, but it is rather like the 
Marxists trying to take over the Labour [sic] party”.42
The Smoking and Tobacco Products Advertisements Bill passed in the Legislative Assembly (Lower House), 30 
votes to 24.69 The Australian Labor Party along with supporting individuals in the governing Liberal and National 
Party coalition supported the Bill; however, it was defeated 17 votes to 12 in the Legislative Council (Upper 
House).69 
Following the Labor Party’s 1983 state election victory under the leadership of Brian Burke, a second attempt at 
legislation to ban cigarette advertising was introduced by Health Minister Barry Hodge, the Tobacco Sale and 
Promotion Bill.69 
During this period, a major focus by health organisations on public campaigning and education resulted in strong 
public support for the Bill and for tobacco control more broadly. The strength of the health coalitions and the 
enthusiasm of those working in them became a major factor in ensuring that further action would occur.
In April 1983, a PM report detailing state by state tobacco control activities for Australia described “excessive 
media coverage” of the recent ban of cigarette sponsorship by the Fremantle Council at its football ground.72 This 
move by the Fremantle Council and the resulting media coverage showed the tobacco industry that local support 
existed for the removal of tobacco company sponsorship from the sporting arena and action could be taken to 
remove logos without legislation. 
As the campaign continued, it was clear that sporting associations were going to ally themselves with their 
tobacco industry funders rather than advocates for the ban on advertising and sponsorship. Tobacco industry 
allies defended the sponsorship rights of the tobacco industry. A memo from Bible to Hamish Maxwell on 29 July 
1983 stated that sports administrators in Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Hobart had held meetings to arrange 
submissions to the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal in defence of TV sponsorship by tobacco companies.73 
Representatives of advertising, publishing and sports associations were described as having “banded together” 
in defence of the tobacco industry’s right to sponsor sporting events and advertise their products. Industry allies 
publicised an industry-supporting opinion poll during discussions with politicians, a key fi nding being that “97% 
of those polled believed sponsorship of sport or the arts was unlikely to make them start smoking”.74 
Tobacco industry representatives and allies commissioned print and television advertisement campaigns 
designed to infl uence public opinion against the proposed bans. A detailed description of these campaigns and 
the rebuttal campaign commissioned by the Government is featured below (see section titled Rallying public 
support for advertising and sponsorship bans).
In its role as advocate for industry-wide issues, the TIA published a 78-page dossier in June 1983 entitled “Sports 
sponsorship – the right to choose”.75, 76 The dossier was intended for use by sporting organisations “where 
attempts were being made to take away their right to seek and accept sponsorship from tobacco companies”.75 
The TIA used the document to lobby the WA Government in preparation for the decision on sponsorship bans and 
rally support from potential allies in the sporting fi eld. According to an INFOGRAM report, the dossier explains 
“why tobacco companies sponsor sport… addresses claims about sponsorship and television and sponsorship 
and children and discusses the future of sporting events if tobacco company sponsorship is banned in Australia”.75 
Recipients of the dossier included all WA parliamentary members, sports and recreation Ministers and Shadow 
Ministers in all states and territories, sports editors of metropolitan and Sunday newspapers and “individual 
broadcast and press journalists who have commented on or are known to be interested in the sponsorship 
debate”.75 
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September 1983 saw the second introduction of the WA anti-tobacco advertising Bill in the Lower House. Regular 
‘weekly highlights’ memos between Bible (PML) and Maxwell (PM USA) provide a detailed overview of the 
progress of the Bill through WA parliament, along with Bible’s comments on the process from a tobacco industry 
representative’s perspective.77, 78 This is a good example of the extent to which US tobacco company executives 
were informed and concerned about issues as far away as WA. 
In a memo to Maxwell (19 September 1983), Bible appeared pessimistic about the fate of the current Bill relative 
to its 1982 predecessor; “On the previous occasion we were successful in our lobbying eff orts to prevent it being 
passed in the Upper House. We are not that confi dent that we can achieve the same this time”.77 The memo refers 
to the introduction of similar Bills in South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory at the time, 
with Bible expressing varying levels of confi dence as to the outcome of each. It is interesting to note that due to 
developments around the country, Bible had become less optimistic about the WA Bill. 
Bible had become slightly more positive that the WA Bill would go in the industry’s favour during the following 
three days when he sent a memo to Maxwell (22 September 1983) advising him of a “discernable change in 
attitude by Liberal Opposition” which Bible noted improved the chance of the Upper House rejecting the Bill, 
although it was “not secure”.78 Bible reassured Maxwell they were “continuing major advertising and media 
campaigns, and continuing political briefi ngs to maintain pressure”.78 
Rallying Public Support for Advertising and Sponsorship Bans
Both sides of the advertising and sponsorship ban debate featured prominently in the media in the lead up to 
parliamentary voting on the Bill. 
Evidence of the “hard fought opinion campaign waged by the industry” can be found in a PM document titled 
“The Western Australian Government’s Attempts to Pass Legislation to Ban Tobacco Promotion”.79 The 157 page 
document was sent as an attachment to a memo from Andrew Whist (see Figure 2) on 13 February 1984 to an 
extensive international distribution list; representatives in New York, Latin America/Iberia, the European Economic 
Community (EEC), Eastern Europe, Middle East, Asia, Canada and Australia.74 The 157 page document is referred to 
hereafter as Whist’s attachment. Whist’s attachment presents each of the print advertisements published by the 
TIA, industry allies, the WA Government and health organisations designed to sway WA public opinion regarding 
tobacco advertising and sponsorship. The document provides evidence of the extent and detail of the tobacco 
industry’s eff orts to monitor the media response to the proposed ban. While there are likely to be additional 
print articles which were left out of Whist’s attachment, 94 print press articles compiled by Media Monitors which 
reported on the ban were presented. 
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Figure 2. Philip Morris International memo from Andrew Whist regarding campaign against 1983 
Bill to ban advertising in Western Australia.74
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Media Campaigns by Opponents of Bans
Advertisements opposing the Bill can be categorised into four groups: those placed by the TIA, by the Australian 
Publishers Bureau, by tobacco industry-sponsored sporting organisations and by other organisations with vested 
interests in continued tobacco promotion.69 
The TIA launched a public awareness campaign in WA print media on 5 September 1983 asking Western 
Australians to “Think. Is it best for the West?” (see Figures 3 and 4).74 The ‘Think’ campaign, authorised by John 
Dollisson, TIA Chief Executive Offi  cer, consisted of a series of fi ve advertisements describing those calling for the 
bans as bullies and as being responsible for cancelling sporting events, destroying cricket, threatening basic 
freedoms and putting Western Australians out of work.80-84 The campaign was supported by 22 businesses and 
sporting organisations whose names were featured on the base lines of each advertisement. The advertisements 
provide examples of common tobacco industry strategies for slowing down proposed tobacco control initiatives. 
The advertisements assisted the TIA to frame the debate in terms of restrictions on basic freedoms, the 
irreplaceable nature of tobacco sponsorship funds and the range of disastrous consequences on the state of 
such a ban. The advertising campaigns were designed specifi cally and solely for use in WA, and demonstrate the 
seriousness with which the tobacco industry attempted to protect its interests in WA. 
The ‘Think’ campaign aimed to:
• Promote the belief that the desire to ban advertising and sponsorship was held by only a few people who were 
trying to ‘bully’ or force bans on the state. It stated: “a vocal minority is trying to pass the bully act on every 
West Australian”, “don’t let a small group of people bully you into a ban on tobacco advertising”, “They’re trying 
to force our State Parliament to pass a law”.80
• Dramatise the potential consequences of an advertising ban. The campaign featured dramatic analogies and 
words which evoke images of negative, paternalistic environments in the viewers mind. It stated: “It’ll be more 
like living in Russia than good old Western Australia”80; “It’ll mean Western Australia will join such countries as 
Ethiopia, East Germany, Iran, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Somalia and Poland, where things like tobacco advertising 
are banned and freedom of choice is defi nitely a luxury”.82
• Promote the belief that by removing tobacco advertisements and sponsorship, the general freedoms of 
Western Australians will be signifi cantly constrained. It stated: “this vocal minority will be killing our freedom 
of choice in the West”80; “you wont be allowed to wear even a simple little T-shirt to the beach, if its printed 
with anything that’s claimed to be tobacco advertising. And that goes for beach umbrellas, sun hats, you name 
it”, “At least our freedom of speech isn’t against the law. Yet.”.82
• Promote the belief that rather than passing through the proper legislative process, the proposed ban on 
advertising and sponsorship would be enacted in a far more sudden and violent manner. It stated: “In one fell 
swoop…”.80
• Criticise the government for focussing on tobacco issues when there are other ‘pressing issues’ they should 
be worried about. It stated: “Shouldn’t our State Government be more interested in fi ghting our rising 
unemployment and infl ation”80; “Our Government would be wasting its time with trivialities when it should be 
concerned with more important matters, like our unemployment crisis”.82
• Promote the belief that the dramatised consequences of a ban would fall on the ‘innocent’ public, without 
mention of the fallout for the tobacco industry itself (e.g., reduced product sales, smoking rate reductions, 
denormalisation of smoking, demonisation of the industry). It stated: “…push around innocent West 
Australians”80, “If they have their way with the ban, any shopkeeper caught displaying even a cigarette poster 
could be punished with a fi ne, and given a criminal record which will stand against his name forever”80; “a vocal 
minority in Western Australia is doing something that’ll be disastrous for our State”, “they’ll put a lot of West 
Australians out of work. Maybe even you”.81
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• Instil a sense of outrage, personal responsibility and urgency in the WA public to act against the proposed 
bans. It stated: “Its something no West Australian should stand for”, “Fight back now”80; “If you care about the 
future of cricket, and your freedom of choice, do something about it now”, “Without your help, someone might 
just stump our cricket”83; “If you care about the future of Western Australia, and your freedom of choice, you 
cant stand by and watch this happen”81; “Call your local MP at Parliament House”.81, 85
• Promote the belief that the proposed bans were completely unnecessary and without a rationale. It stated: 
“For the sake of common sense”.80
• Feature high profi le individuals in campaigns to give an impression of credibility to authoritative sounding 
quotes which are not based on solid research. An excerpt from a book written by Australian cricketer Rod 
Marsh was quoted in one advertisement: “it would upset the applecart…cricket itself would suff er, all the 
way down to the basic development level. The ‘anti’ lobby argues that tobacco advertising encourages young 
people – kids – to smoke. Rubbish, I say. Kids start smoking for a variety of reasons, but one of them is not 
because the words ‘Benson and Hedges Company’ are displayed on cricket ground fences”.83
The graphics featured in the ads complement the text and provide a comprehensive message.80, 83, 84 It is clear that 
the aim behind the campaign was to encourage WA smokers to exert pressure on the government in line with the 
industry’s agenda and generate the appearance of public opposition to the proposed bans. 
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Figure 3. Example of Tobacco Institute of Australia advertising campaign “Think. Is it best for the 
West?”: Someone’s putting pressure on our sport.84
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Figure 4. Example of Tobacco Institute of Australia advertising campaign “Think. Is it best for 
the West?”: Someone’s trying to bully innocent West Australians.80
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A further fi ve print advertisements authorised by Dollisson on behalf of the TIA were retrieved from the tobacco 
document archives.86-90 Exploiting the public’s distaste for fi nes, two of the advertisements focus on the potential 
fi nancial penalty for displaying tobacco brand names.86, 87 The ads publicise the extreme and unlikely potential 
extent of legislation banning tobacco advertising and sponsorship in an eff ort to generate public attitudes of 
absurdity and outrage: 
• “the new law means magazines containing any form of tobacco advertising, such as The Bulletin, Playboy, the 
Women’s Weekly, could be banned altogether”.86 
• “Unlike most Australian laws, you’re guilty until you prove your innocence”.87 
To a similar end, the most trivial situations potentially drawing a fi ne were highlighted: 
• a $1000 “penalty stands for wearing a Marlboro jacket, or using a Winfi eld carry-bag”.87 
• “It could even be against the law to off er someone a cigarette in public”.86
The threat to personal freedoms is also highlighted as in the ‘Think’ campaign: 
• “It will deny you the freedom to read, hear, say what up till now we’ve always taken for granted”.86 
• “we’ll pay with the loss of liberties and freedoms – small and large”.87 
Encouraging the public to question the rationale behind the proposed bans, four advertisements misrepresent 
the evidence for banning advertising and sponsorship and deny that exposure to tobacco product logos and 
brand names encourage smoking: 
• “…banning advertising and sponsorship doesn’t have any eff ect on whether people smoke. Evidence from 
overseas tells us this, and so does plain common sense. People smoke for lots of reasons, but seeing a badge 
on a cap isn’t one of them”.87 
• “Cigarette advertising is designed to inform smokers of the choice available to them…The simple fact is that 
cigarette advertising is the last thing that makes people take up smoking”.88
• “In Russia, where cigarette advertising hasn’t been allowed for over sixty years, millions of Russians choose to 
smoke. What makes them start? Quite obviously it isn’t advertising”.89
• “…most West Australians realise that cigarette advertising doesn’t make people start smoking anyway”.90
One TIA advertisement refers to Norway, Italy, Singapore and Russia highlighting the lack of change in cigarette 
consumption after those countries banned advertising.89 The TIA off er another angle to their argument, “if a 
product is legal to make and off er for sale, it should be legal to advertise”.88
Public opinion surveys were commissioned to monitor public support in WA for an advertising ban.74 The results 
of a Roy Morgan Research Centre Gallup poll featured in one TIA campaign advertisement.90 In response to the 
question “Should the Government ban tobacco advertising?”, the advertisement claims that 52% said ‘no’ in May 
1983 and “Now 68% say NO” in October 1983, based on a WA sample of 480 participants. The advertisement 
concludes: “Obviously, banning tobacco advertising is not best for the West. If you agree with the majority of 
people, please express your concern by phoning your local MP…”.90
The Australian Publishers Bureau also publicly allied with the tobacco industry, publishing an advertisement in 
The West Australian on 10 October 1983 titled ‘Your freedom under challenge’.91 The advertisement described the 
proposed legislation as “a dangerous attack on basic freedoms” and highlights the slippery slope argument: 
“At present the target is tobacco, but once the precedent is established there will be the ever-present temptation 
to bring into the net other everyday goods in which some consider there is a health risk factor”.91 
The Confederation of Major Participant and Spectator Sports (COMPASS) ran a separate campaign rallying for 
public support to oppose the proposed ban on tobacco company sponsorship of sport.79 COMPASS was a single 
issue front group for the tobacco industry which posed as a legitimate sporting organisation. The group’s purpose 
was to lobby against the proposed legislation. COMPASS was set up by the tobacco industry to advocate for the 
tobacco industry’s interest.92 
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In 1984, the TIA publicised the results of a Morgan Gallup Poll which found that “Western Australians favoured 
cigarette advertising and sport sponsorship more than other States, despite massive Government campaigns”.93 
These results were favourable to the tobacco industry and were publicised to promote the impression that the 
majority of the WA public oppose bans on advertising and sponsorship.
Media Campaigns by Proponents of Bans
Advertisements published by proponents of tobacco advertising bans were, for the most part, limited to those 
placed by the WA government and a joint campaign by health organisations coordinated by ACOSH.79 
Andrew Whist’s attachment featured copies of the public awareness print campaigns published by groups in 
favour of the Bill. The document describes the State government’s campaign as evolving from a “reasonably 
conventional “anti-smoking” campaign” into a “very tough attack on cigarette advertising” [emphasis in original].79 
The government’s campaign followed the theme ‘Give kids a chance’, which focused on preventing smoking 
initiation by rallying public support to ban tobacco advertising and sponsorship (see Figures 5 
and 6). The government advertisement appeared in a wide range of WA media. The government’s campaign 
was criticised in Whist’s attachment: “the campaign broke several basic rules (aside, evidently, from being 
believable) by using too many diff erent messages”.79 
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Figure 5. Example of ‘Give kids a chance’ public awareness campaign by the Government of 
Western Australia: Nobody in their right mind would teach their kids to smoke.94
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Figure 6. Example of ‘Give kids a chance’ public awareness campaign by the Government 
of Western Australia: The defenceless minority.95 
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The government’s campaign addressed some of the myths perpetuated in the TIA and COMPASS advertisements 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3. Government campaign response to myths perpetuated in COMPASS advertisement 
campaign. 
Myths in COMPASS advertisements Government campaign response
Bans would restrict basic freedoms 
(e.g., freedom of the press).
Highlighted the lack of freedom in addiction.
Lack of infl uence of advertising on children. Emphasised that advertising is highly infl uential on children.
Advertising intends only to increase market 
share and brand switching among current 
smokers.
Highlighted the eff ectiveness of advertising in developing 
an appealing brand image and familiarity that encourages 
smoking initiation.
Tobacco companies are responsible for the 
majority of sport sponsorship funding.
Placed tobacco industry funding into perspective among all 
the other sponsors, informing the public that it was merely a 
small proportion of overall funding directed at only the most 
watched sports (i.e., rarely developmental levels or country 
sport).
The issue was framed in terms of freedom 
and the threat to the sustainability of sport.
Framed the issue in terms of the health dangers of smoking 
and the need to protect children.
Representing over 20 Australian health organisations, ACOSH published print advertisements in the local 
newspapers of fi ve WA electoral provinces on 11 and 12 October 1983.96-100 Each advertisement cited region-
specifi c statistics of the number of people who had died between 1980 and 1982 from diseases caused by 
smoking and the number of children aged 9 to 16 years who were already smokers. Readers were encouraged 
to support the Bill and were provided with the contact details of their local member of parliament. A further 
advertisement published by ACOSH in The West Australian on 20 October 1983 highlighted the consensus of 
the medical and health communities regarding the health risks of smoking.101 The need to protect children was 
reinforced and public support for the government’s tobacco control initiatives was encouraged. 
Prominent car retailer John Hughes published a personal statement in The Daily News on 17 October 1983 
in support of the WA Bill to ban tobacco advertising.102
Media Coverage
A considerable amount of print media coverage resulted from the debate over the proposed legislation.79 
Andrew Whist’s attachment stated that the media coverage and advertising from both sides of the debate made 
it “the dominant media question for many weeks”. The report included copies of over 70 print news articles and 
18 editorials (from The Daily News, The West Australian, The Australian, Financial Review, Weekend News, The Bulletin 
between 22 July 1983 and 27 October 1983). Whist’s attachment noted that media in the Eastern States had given 
the debate “plenty of coverage”. 
The media coverage quoted the tobacco industry and its allies promoting diff erent arguments designed to sway 
public opinion away from the advertising ban. Allies and their arguments included:
• The Outdoor Advertising Association warned of a loss of jobs and the threat to small businesses103;
• A spokesman for the Advertising Federation of Australia noted that banning advertising left “no way of 
informing the public about alternative low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes”104
• The director of the Australian Publishers’ Bureau argued that tobacco advertising does not eff ect cigarette 
consumption and a ban would see advertising revenue diverted away from local publishers26
• The Sports Federation of Victoria described the potential banning of sports sponsorship as “the biggest 
setback to sport in 40 years”105
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• The President of the WA Darts Council stated that the Government’s selective use of information in its 
campaign against sports sponsorship distorted “truth and reality”.106
Other organisations with vested interests in tobacco advertising and sponsorship whose views were covered 
in the media included the WA Trotting Association, Claremont Speedway, the TIA, the Independent Retailers 
Association, COMPASS and the WA Greyhound Racing Association. Strategic arguments presented through the 
media included: denying the infl uence of tobacco advertising on youth smoking, focussing on what the industry 
believe are ‘actual’ causes of youth smoking, giving personal examples of workers whose businesses would be 
‘ruined’ by a ban107 and quoting polls which showed public support for sponsorship and advertising by tobacco 
companies. 
The media articles documented in Whist’s attachment opposed the ban on advertising by featuring specifi c 
views of those opposed to the ban or by highlighting fl aws in the government’s campaign or process. It is unclear 
whether these articles are refl ective of the total media coverage at the time or whether the tobacco industry were 
more interested in collecting articles that supported their perspective.
Interest in Health Ministers
State Health Ministers are seen as important by tobacco companies not only for action that can occur within 
their own jurisdictions, but for their role in national fora such as the Australian Health Ministers Council and the 
Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy (MCDS). WA has experienced a succession of Health Ministers who have taken 
a strong lead on tobacco control nationally as well as within WA, led initially by Barry Hodge, who was a strong 
and eff ective Ministerial campaigner for tobacco control action nationally. 
The tobacco industry has persistently engaged in lobbying government decision makers in many countries in 
an attempt to further the industry’s agenda.108 References to WA Health Ministers can be found in the tobacco 
industry documents.72, 109, 110 References include monitoring of the extent to which government members are 
perceived to be accommodating, balanced or critical of the tobacco industry.72, 111, 112 
A status report by PM on ‘anti-industry activities in Australia’ (April 1983) provided a state-wide and federal update 
on government members’ positions on tobacco issues and tobacco control initiatives.72 Barry Hodge, WA Health 
Minister appointed in early 1983, is described in the report as an “active member of the Non-Smokers Movement” 
who intends to reintroduce a Bill to ban tobacco company advertising and sponsorship with Dr Thomas Dadour 
after it was defeated by only a small margin months earlier.72 Realising that Hodge was no ally to the industry the 
report stated, “There is a clear message that the new Health Minister is out to get the industry and will waste no 
time in trying to do so”.72 Knowledge of Hodge’s stance on tobacco was far-reaching. Whist’s attachment (February 
1984) sent from the PM New York offi  ce to an international distribution list described Hodge as a “vehement anti-
tobacco Health Minister”.74 Hodge announced that the 1983 SLF increase would be only one aspect of a fi ve-part 
$6 million anti-smoking campaign to be implemented over a three year period.74
Outcome of the 1983 Bill 
Memos between Geoff  Bible in Australia and Hamish Maxwell in New York closely followed the progress of the 
Bill through the Upper and Lower Houses.73, 77, 78, 113-116 On 30 September 1983, Bible told Maxwell of “unfounded 
accusations of payouts and dishonesty by the tobacco industry” made by the Premier, Brian Burke, under 
parliamentary privilege.114, 117
The optimism refl ected in Bible’s memo a week earlier78 remained as he noted: “we think we might be beginning 
to get the upper hand in W.A. and I am now beginning to think we stand some chance of having the Bill defeated 
or heavily amended in the upper house”.114 Indeed, the WA Bill was amended in the Upper House after three 
readings in the Lower House, removing all advertising and marketing ban clauses and retaining only those aimed 
at restricting cigarette sales to minors.69, 111, 113 Bible described the outcome as “good news”.111 In the Lower House, 
37 members of parliament representing 68% of the electorate voted in support of the amended Bill, while 20 
parliamentarians representing 32% voted against it.69 In the Upper House, 15 members representing 53% of the 
electorate supported the Bill and 17 parliamentarians representing 41% of the electorate voted to defeat the Bill.69 
While this was a narrow margin, Bible wrote to Maxwell, “you will recall at the outset we thought we would lose”.111 
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On 21 October 1983 Maxwell sent a memo to Bible: “We are truly delighted with the outcome in Western Australia 
and wish to congratulate you, Phil Francis and all the others who worked so hard to bring about this excellent 
result”.118 
Maintaining his resolve to target smoking rates, Premier Burke stated that his government would not accept 
the Bill in its amended form. The Bill was sent to a conference of management of members from both Houses.113 
The six representatives nominated by their own party were to come to a unanimous decision or the Bill would 
lapse.113 In response to this situation, Bible noted to Maxwell: “we are reasonably assured that there will not be 
a unanimous vote as Liberals are suggesting nominations in our favour”.113 Premier Burke was proving to be an 
obstacle for the tobacco industry, with Bible acknowledging Burke’s intention to “keep pushing this Bill forward at 
every opportunity” and noting that “it would appear that Burke intends to persist”.113 
The WA Lower House rejected the signifi cantly watered-down Bill “after heated debate”, where it was returned 
to the Upper House.115 Bible noted that the government’s rationale for this was that “juvenile smoking could not 
be solved without an advertising ban” and “the government had a mandate from the electorate to ban cigarette 
advertising”.115 Bible was optimistic the Bill would once again be rejected by the Upper House; however, he 
acknowledged “we are still not yet out of the woods in W.A.”.115
Tobacco industry campaign expenditure against the 1983 Bill refl ected the threat the legislation posed to 
industry profi ts. A tobacco industry spokesman stated that the “very signifi cant swing in public opinion” towards 
the industry’s agenda “was achieved at less than half the cost of the $6m the Western Australian Government is 
spending over three years on its antismoking campaign”.119 By contrast, the government estimated an expenditure 
of $300,000 in support of the proposed legislation.69 
A memo from Andrew Whist (Vice President, Corporate Aff airs, PMI) in the PM New York offi  ce titled “Final 
appraisal of the public campaign to defend marketing rights in Western Australia” was sent on 13 February 1984 
to an extensive international distribution list.74 The three-page memo detailed the history of the 1983 Bill to 
ban tobacco advertising in WA, from its origins in “the state Labor Party’s long standing opposition to tobacco 
advertising and promotion” to its ultimate failure due to ‘irreconcilable diff erences’ between the Upper House, 
Lower House and the ‘Conference of Managers’. Whist credited the “stalemate victory” to “a hard fought public 
opinion campaign waged by the industry”.74 The concluding paragraph of Whist’s memo read: “The industry feels 
that the matter has been put to rest for a considerable period of time. This represents a clear-cut victory for us, 
won after one of the most heated open debates that the industry has ever faced”.74 
While there are few internal industry documents available in the document archives regarding the 1982 Private 
Members Bill to ban tobacco advertising and sponsorship, many documents are available regarding the 1983 
Bill introduced by the WA government. The tobacco industry’s interest in WA developed considerably between 
the Bills so that in 1983 tobacco company executives spent considerable time monitoring and responding to 
developments in WA.
Two PML ‘weekly highlights’ memos from 1984 written by William Webb demonstrate that the company was 
bracing itself for a possible third attempt at a legislative advertising ban in 1984.93, 120 In a memo sent 7 September 
1984, Webb informed recipients that the WA Labor Party had voted for the reintroduction of a Bill to ban tobacco 
advertising at the State Conference; however, Premier Burke refused to reintroduce the Bill “until after the next 
election when he hopes to control the Legislative Council”.93 Prior to this, in July 1984, PML had briefed the Mojo 
advertising agency to develop a campaign to counter the WA Bill to ban the advertising of tobacco products “as 
soon as it is introduced”.120 
Musk, Shean and Woodward published a paper in 1985 in the British Medical Journal documenting the 
unsuccessful legislative attempts to ban tobacco advertising and sponsorship.69 A June 1985 ‘Infotopics’ report 
provided a summary of the paper to the tobacco industry.121 
Progress stalled until the late 1980s.122 
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Tobacco Control Act 1990
A third attempt to ban tobacco advertising and sponsorship came in the form of the Tobacco Control Bill 1990 
which proposed signifi cant restrictions on tobacco industry activities. In August 1989, Labor Premier Peter 
Dowding announced a proposal to prohibit tobacco product advertising and sponsorship, competitions by 
tobacco companies and the distribution of free tobacco samples, while increasing the SLF and establishing a 
health promotion foundation from hypothecated tobacco taxes.1 The Act was passed in December 1990.1
The Premier’s decision to legislate followed several years of intense lobbying by health organisations such as 
ACOSH, the AMA, the Cancer Council (then the Cancer Foundation) and the National Heart Foundation. Following 
the Premier’s announcement there was a period of even more intense lobbying by both the health coalition 
and the tobacco industry and its allies. The case for action was substantially strengthened by the passage of 
tobacco control legislation in Victoria that banned tobacco advertising and promotion while increasing the SLF, 
using some of the revenue to replace tobacco advertising and sponsorship. Surveys had shown that this would 
be popular, and once implemented it was highly successful. A similar approach was taken in WA; this resulted in 
support, not only from health groups, but from many in sport and the arts, and also from key media.
A Healthy Level of Sponsorship: the Establishment of Healthway
The Western Australian Health Promotion Foundation, Healthway, was established in 1991 under the Western 
Australian Tobacco Control Act 1990.122 
A copy of the Western Australian Parliament Legislative Council ‘Report of Standing Committee on Legislation in 
relation to the Tobacco Bill 1990’ is held within the PM archives.123 While scientifi c evidence of the diseases caused 
by smoking formed the basis of medical professionals and public health representatives’ rationale for banning 
tobacco advertising, tobacco industry representatives avoided health arguments.69 
The report123 lists the arguments put forward by the tobacco industry and their sporting industry allies in lobbying 
to maintain the status quo on tobacco advertising and sponsorship in WA:
• Smoking is an adult behaviour in which adults make an informed decision to engage in. Advertising informs 
consumer choice
• Advertising infl uences brand selection and does not induce a want for the product where one did not 
previously exist
• Removing advertising will not reduce smoking rates. Evidence of this is the lack of change in smoking 
incidence since advertising was removed from television 
• Banning tobacco advertising will negatively impact the advertising and print media industry
• Tobacco companies sponsor sport to promote goodwill and engage in good corporate citizenship by giving 
back to the community, not to promote smoking
• The tobacco industry favours self-regulation through a voluntary code which addresses concerns regarding 
youth smoking
• Without tobacco industry funding, many sporting and cultural events would not be fi nancially viable and 
would result in loss of jobs and the discontinuation of signifi cant sporting events in WA. 
The Standing Committee on Legislation123 heard evidence from various representatives from the Australian 
tobacco companies and affi  liates:
• Peter Alexander, Director of Industry Aff airs, Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd and John Gonczi, Solicitor
• David Bacon, Manager Corporate Aff airs, Wills Australia
• Richard Mulcahy, CEO, Tobacco Institute of Australia
• Michael Apps, State Manager Western Australian Tobacco Institute
• Gary Berson, Solicitor, Robinson Cox
• Ian Wall, Corporate Aff airs Manager and David Steer, State Manager, PML
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The report123 provides evidence that the tobacco industry was monitoring WA to identify legislation that would 
impact on the industry. The tobacco industry responded to legislative tobacco control proposals in WA by 
delaying the legislative process with standard industry arguments and attempts to water down tobacco control 
measures. Industry allies augmented the tobacco industry’s campaign. Evidence from the Standing Committee’s 
report featured in international tobacco industry documents including papers by smokers’ rights group FOREST 
(Freedom Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco),124 the Tobacco Institute of New Zealand,125, 126 and 
the Tobacco Institute of India.127 
The November 1991 edition of The Australian Retail Tobacconist warned Australian retailers of the 1990 WA 
Tobacco Control Act and attempted to generate concern from Eastern States tobacco retailers that the restrictions 
might spread.128 The author describes the WA Labor Government as having “taken a punt on being considered to 
be politically correct in introducing this anti-small business legislation as against the votes it will continue to lose 
from the small business sector. Please don’t confuse this matter with a concern by the WA Government for public 
health”.128 Retailers are encouraged to contact their local member of government to “express concern for the 
possibility of the introduction of repressive legislation”.128 In this way, the tobacco industry mobilised its allies in 
the retail sector to lobby the government with the industry’s agenda. 
In October 1991, the Price Waterhouse Economic Studies and Strategies Unit prepared a report for the TIA 
regarding “the rationale, funding and operations” of Australian health promotion foundations.129 The preface 
describes the report as an “independent review of the concept of health promotion foundations in Australia”.129 
In response to the WA government announcing a review of Healthway,130 Price Waterhouse published a report in 
January 1995 titled ‘Comment on the rationale, implications and impacts of health promotion foundations with 
reference to the Western Australian Health Promotion Foundation’.131 It is interesting to note that the report on 
Healthway prepared by Price Waterhouse is reminiscent of traditional tobacco industry arguments (for example, 
it described taxes as “regressive” and stated that governments already have enough funds to distribute) despite 
Price Waterhouse purporting to be an independent organisation. 
Martin Riordan of Wills Australia sent the reports on Australian health promotion foundations to company 
representatives in South Africa, China, England, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.132 On 25 May 
1995, Riordan sent a memo to the international company representatives expressing his hope that the Price 
Waterhouse report on Healthway commissioned by the “Australian Industry” (the TIA) was helpful.132 Riordan wrote 
that he would be forwarding the reports to David Bacon, BAT in England “in case other operating companies face 
similar tobacco sporting/funding replacement groups being suggested by their governments”.132 Riordan noted 
the tobacco industry’s concern over the potential spreading of health promotion foundations, stating: “These 
government groups which are funded as hypothecated taxation vehicles by health bureaucrats really must be 
stopped from spreading”.132 
3.3.3 Taxation
The 1983 proposal by the WA Government to increase cigarette taxes met with tobacco industry opposition and a 
keen focus on WA by signifi cant tobacco industry representatives. A report sent in April 1983 titled “Status report 
on anti-industry activities in Australia” stated: “…excise and State Licence Fees will almost certainly be hiked this 
year which will produce a Thatcher like approach and have a serious eff ect on the industry in this country. The 
most certain way to reduce consumption is through price”.72
A 1983 memo (22 June) from Phil Francis to Andrew Whist in the PM New York offi  ce detailed a PM media 
campaign implemented in WA opposing tax increases on tobacco products (see Figure 7).133 Francis believed the 
campaign needed “revamping in order to increase its impact”. The campaign attempted to build outrage among 
WA smokers and rally support to lobby local Parliament members on behalf of the industry. The six chapters of the 
campaign were titled “Lop-Sided”, “Fight Fair!”, “Unfair”, “Mis-Directed”, “Too Much”, and “Slug”.133, 134 This campaign 
represented the tobacco industry’s allocation of funds to obstruct tobacco control initiatives seen as ultimately 
eff ective in reducing smoking. 
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Figure 7. Philip Morris (Australia) Limited memo to New York offi  ce regarding campaign opposing 
1983 tax increase in Western Australia.133
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As an adjunct to the campaign, PM organised a petition to be “distributed right throughout the whole of W.A.” 
from which they expected to gather “in excess of 100,000 signatures”.133, 135 In a follow-up memo to Hamish 
Maxwell on 29 July 1983, Geoff  Bible reported that the petition was handed to the State Opposition Leader, Ray 
O’Connor three days earlier bearing a more modest 35,000 signatures.73 The handover was said to have received 
radio, TV and other press coverage.73 PM also distributed 100,000 postage paid cards addressed to Premier 
Brian Burke which read, “We smokers already pay enough in taxes. The new State licence fee of 35% is excessive 
and unfair. It will especially hurt pensioners and ordinary wage earners. Please think again about imposing this 
additional burden on smokers”.136 The petition and postage paid cards were attempts to increase support for the 
tobacco industry.
Nowhere on the advertisements, card or petition, is PM mentioned. However, tobacco industry affi  liated 
organisations were acknowledged at the bottom of the advertisement: The Tobacco Institute, The Australian Retail 
Tobacconist, The Associated Newsagents (WA.) Co-operative Society Limited, Cruickshank Tobacco Products Pty 
Ltd, T.P.D Distributors and W.J. Hurford Federal President of the Federated Tobacco Workers Union Australia.134 
In a regular “weekly highlights” memo (24 June 1983), Jack Sporton updated Maxwell on PM eff orts to oppose the 
State’s proposed cigarette tax increase.137 To build on the advertisements, petitions and letters, the memo outlined 
that “media interviews have been used to protest against the tobacco licence fee hike” and “Managing Directors 
of the tobacco companies have arranged to see the Premier”.137 A subsequent memo from Bible to Maxwell 
(1 July 1983) described the outcome of the meetings with Premier Burke and senior Opposition politicians as 
“not promising”116; however, industry representatives suggestions of a reduction in the fee increase was agreed 
to be taken to Cabinet. On 24 June 1983, Sporton further indicated that PM was aware of the Federated Tobacco 
Workers, Metal Trades, and Electrical Trades Union groups’ joint delegation to the WA Trades & Labour Council 
seeking “support for opposing the proposed State Licence fee increase in Western Australia”.137
The Bill to increase the SLF in WA from 12.5% to 35% was introduced on 26 July 1983.73, 138 Bible reported to 
Maxwell three days later: “the State Opposition strongly opposed the amount of the increase, as did Tom Dadour”. 
Bible expressed hope that the Opposition would amend the tax increase to 25%.73 The WA SLF was successfully 
increased to 35%.77 Federal excise tax and SLF increases had the desired eff ect of reducing cigarette sales, to the 
disappointment of industry representatives.78, 139
Bible wrote to Maxwell on 22 September 1983: “It is very concerning that industry volume in Western Australia 
appears to be off  some 20% following the July 1 State Licence Fee increase of 30 cents a pack”.78 Bible described 
WA tobacco product sales as “very slack” and expressed hope that the round of tax and SLF increases had ended. 
Bible further wrote, “While they have had a devastating eff ect upon the price of cigarettes we can take comfort 
from the knowledge that excise taxes and State licence fees when added together still represent on average only 
about 53% of the price of a packet of cigarettes”.78 Bible concluded the memo with an optimistic tone: “we are 
therefore still in good shape in my opinion, which should enable us to have some confi dence in the ability of the 
industry to recover from these increases”.78
Jim Morgan, PM USA, sent a memo on 9 March 1990 to fellow PM colleagues (Senior Vice President Sales PMI, 
Senior Vice President Marketing PM Inc., President/Chief Executive Offi  cer PM Inc, PM Executive Vice President, 
Operations) titled ‘Value Segment Synopsis – The Australian Market’.140 The report confi rmed the ongoing pressure 
on the industry from tobacco control measures to which WA was a signifi cant contributor.
“The major factors impacting on the industry are the increasing eff orts of the anti-smoking lobby to 
persuade the Government to increase taxes and ban tobacco advertising and the reduction in federally 
sourced State budgets leading to the necessity for increased revenue from traditional State tax sources. 
Australia has consequently seen a steady rise in the level of direct taxation and because of this consumers 
are being forced to pay ever increasing prices for cigarettes”. 
At the time of the memo, the WA SLF had increased to the rate of 50%.140
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In March 1993, Bible (Executive Vice President, International, PM Companies Inc.) expressed his growing 
frustration at the success of taxation as a tobacco control measure: “we must prevent state license fees moving 
beyond their current levels. About thirteen years ago, these did not exist at all. Today, they are at the 75% level 
– it is unbelievable what this has done to our profi tability”.141 A 1995 PM Annual report retrieved from William 
Siemers’ offi  ce (PM Management Corporation, New York)142 presented the SLF for each of the Australian States 
and Territories as they were at the end of the year for the period 1981 to 1995. Between the end of years 1991 and 
1993 WA’s SLF increased from 50% to 100%.
The state franchise fee for tobacco products was abolished in 1997 when its constitutional validity was 
challenged. Section 90 of the Australian Constitution prohibits Australian states from raising revenue from the sale 
of products.143 Taxation for tobacco products became the responsibility of the federal government.144 Since that 
time, tobacco industry lobbying against tobacco tax increases has been carried out at the federal level where the 
industry uses means such as political donations and contributions through third parties.145-148 
3.3.4 Pack Labelling and Health Warnings
In 1991, the Tobacco Task Force chaired by Mike Daube set up by the MCDS reviewed the existing health warnings 
on cigarette packs.149 A report prepared by the Victorian Centre for Behavioural Research in Cancer for the 
Working Party recommended that measures be taken to strengthen health warning labels on Australian cigarette 
packaging.150 The WA government proved to be one of the most motivated of any state or territory government 
on the issue and its attempt to implement the health warning legislation meant it was a target of industry 
strategies to interfere and delay legislation. 
The tobacco industry monitored each state’s support for more comprehensive health warnings to determine 
where their lobbying resources should be focussed. A memo from Phil Francis (Corporate Aff airs, PML) to Matthew 
Winokur (Director, Corporate Aff airs PMI) on 30 June 1992 discussed the political situation in each of the Australian 
states and the likelihood of stronger health warnings on cigarette packs being implemented.151 Francis identifi ed 
WA as one of the states where the “Health Minister would recommend strongly that the warnings proceed”. 
Francis continued, “…it is the Premiers and Health Ministers for Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia 
who need turning around”. Winokur was assured that “Intelligence from Health Departments around the nation is 
being gathered regularly”.151
In June 1992, William Murray, President and Chief Operating Offi  cer of PM Companies Inc., wrote to the Australian 
Prime Minister and each of the State Premiers in regard to the MCDS proposal to change the format of health 
warnings on cigarette packaging.152 The WA Premier, Dr Carmen Lawrence, received the letter which urged the 
government to reject the proposal on the grounds that the warnings were “unnecessary”, “excessively skewed 
against the tobacco industry”, and contribute to the tobacco industry’s belief that Australia is a “nanny” state.153 
Murray argued against new warnings on the grounds that Australians were already suffi  ciently aware of health 
warnings regarding smoking (“one would have to be asleep in a cave for twenty years not to be aware”), youth 
education about smoking issues would be better accomplished in the school or family environment, and the 
proposed warnings “are an abusive and punitive defacement of a legal product”.153  
Various tobacco companies monitored WA media resources regarding pack labelling. A copy of The West 
Australian article “Warning rules for cigarettes made tougher” (24 Dec 1992) was received by the PMI offi  ce.154 
The article highlighted WA as having a tough stance on tobacco control and a willingness to set legislative 
tobacco control precedents. The article read154: 
“WA has become the fi rst State in Australia to introduce tough new regulations requiring cigarette packets 
to be virtually covered in health warnings. The regulations – believed to be the strictest in the world – were 
introduced yesterday but will not take eff ect until July 1. All States agreed to the restrictions in April but 
local health authorities have led the way because WA has the most extensive Tobacco Control Act, making 
the changes easier to introduce…From July 1, health warnings will cover the fl ip top, a side and the entire 
back of cigarette packets.” Further measures were suggested in the article which would move towards 
generic packaging: “State and Federal governments have agreed to consider banning tobacco company 
logos and designs next year…”. 
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On 24 December 1992, Winokur (PMI) alerted a distribution list of PM executives to “new, adverse developments 
on the pack labelling strategy”.155 A PM consultant based in Australia, John Harvey*, had alerted Winokur to the 
WA government’s decision to gazette pack labelling legislation in line with MCDS recommendations.155 Winokur 
described the industry strategy as having been “to get the Victorian State Premier to introduce alternative 
legislation based on the EC labelling directive”.155 In response to the new development, John Harvey and Phil 
Francis were “preparing a revised strategy to head off  West Australia’s initiative”.155 
Geoff  Bible sent William Webb a memo on 31 December 1992 on the topic of “Western Australia Regulations”.156 
Shortly before writing the memo, Bible had been informed of the new WA warning label regulations and stated 
“I had not realized that potentially it was so imminent. Of course, this is quite a set back and our task now is to 
prevent its spreading to other States”.156 The tobacco company executives employed legal advice in the hope 
of delaying inevitable legislation: “Are there any grounds on which we can seek an injunction which could hold 
things over until the State election...in February 1993? In any event, I am sure you understand my concern and 
that I am grasping for straws of hope. If you could off er any, I would be very glad to hear of them”.156
A reply from Webb to Bible on 5 January 1993 stated “The regulations came as a complete surprise to the industry 
in Australia and to me”.157 Of the delay strategy suggested by Bible, Webb off ered “several legal steps which could 
be taken to defer implementation of the regulations but ultimately the most appropriate action would appear to 
be to apply as much political pressure as possible”.157 Webb informed Bible that PM was attempting to reach the 
WA Liberal party through John Harvey (PM consultant) and John Bertrand (Australian yachtsman who skippered 
Australia II to victory in the 1983 America’s Cup). Bertrand was thought to have good contacts in the WA Liberal 
party.157 Providing PM had Liberal party support, PM considered running an advertising campaign in the weeks 
prior to the election. 
Bertrand and Harvey represent the use of third parties and intermediaries by PM in political lobbying.158 PM 
Group of Companies was a principle sponsor of the Australia One team led by Bertrand in the 1995 America’s Cup, 
contributing fi nancially and through the provision of marketing, legal and computing resources.159 The Australian 
Prime Minister, Paul Keating, and the Leader of the Opposition, Dr John Hewson, were co-patrons of Australia 
One and State Premiers acted as State Patrons.160 In 1992, Bertrand approached PM in New York and requested 
sponsorship funding for the 1995 America’s Cup.161 A video-taped message from the Australian Prime Minister 
to the PM Group of Companies was part of Bertrand’s sales pitch.161 Bertrand had a “special relationship” with Jim 
Humphreys, Australia’s Consul-General in New York, who had been his “mentor” at the New York Yacht Club.162 
Craig Fuller, Senior Vice President of Corporate Aff airs, PM Companies Inc, later developed a “great friendship” with 
Humphreys after they were introduced by Bertrand.162 
On 11 January 1993, Webb informed Bible that Francis and the Corporate Aff airs Directors of other tobacco 
companies were to meet with the WA Health Minister; however, Webb stated: “we do not hold out much hope 
for a successful outcome from this meeting”.163 Attempts to meet with WA Premier Dr. Carmen Lawrence were 
unsuccessful.163 A handwritten note by Bible on a memo he received from Webb (15 January 1993) read: “There is 
some daylight. Everything will depend on Liberals winning W.A election”.164 The Liberal Party assumed offi  ce in the 
WA government on 16 February 1993 with Richard Court as Premier and Peter Foss as Health Minister.
On 8 January 1993, Owen Smith (Associate General Counsel & Secretary, PM Management Corporation) sent 
Murray (President and Chief Operating Offi  cer, PM Companies Inc.) a memo with sketches of the WA health 
warning labelling regulations.165, 166 These sketches refl ect the detailed knowledge of WA tobacco issues in the 
New York offi  ce of PMI. 
A January 1993 letter from John Owen of W.D & H.O Wills in New Zealand to David Bacon of BAT discussed the 
health warning and pack labelling regulations gazetted in Perth in December 1992 which made for “alarming 
reading”.167 Owen stated: “If past experience is anything to go by, similar initiatives in New Zealand cannot be far 
away”. Owen further stated: “I believe that the latest moves to introduce packaging changes heralds the biggest 
battle to be fought by the industry”.167
                                                                                                             
*  Political consultant to Philip Morris (Australia) Limited as well as the former Chief of Staff  to New South Wales Premier Nick Greiner and 
leading Federal Parliamentarian Andrew Peacock.
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During February and March 1993 Francis sent regular updates to Bible on the status of health warnings and 
content labelling in Australian states.109, 110, 112, 168, 169 On 18 February 1993 Francis had returned from a visit to Perth 
and was “able to reconfi rm that the new government* will not introduce the already gazetted (ALP) [Australian 
Labor Party] regulations”.109 A follow-up status report sent on 25 February 1993 informed Bible that Foss had 
“declared publicly…that he would be proceeding with the health warning regulations gazetted by the labor 
government”.110 Francis stated “We have prepared the necessary statements to take legal action should Foss not 
back down”. A handwritten note from Bible on the side of the memo read “A setback in WA but I spoke to Phil last 
night and he thinks (can’t be sure) we are back on track. It’s being closely watched” [emphasis in original]. The 
close of the memo listed a number of “priorities” including “getting Foss to accept EEC directive and regulate”.110 
The EEC directive proposed relatively weaker warnings than those Foss advocated. Warnings would be printed on 
the side of cigarette packs and cover a minimum of 4% of the pack surface.170 The tobacco industry preferred the 
weaker EEC directive if any regulations were to be introduced.171
A status report from Francis on 11 March 1993 informed Bible of a “diffi  cult” meeting with WA Health Minister Foss 
who “did not refl ect the previous understanding undertaken by the Premier”.112 Foss wanted to proceed with the 
health warning requirements agreed upon at the 1992 MCDS meeting112 which included procuring 25 percent 
of the front of cigarette packs to display 12 rotating health warnings, one third of the back to display health 
warnings, health information and the national Quitline telephone number and one side of the pack to display 
tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide content.172 Francis used his political contacts – including Victorian Premier 
Jeff  Kennett – to quash Foss’s motivation to pursue the MCDS proposal. Kennett ‘told’ Court to “over-ride his 
Minister”.112 Francis described holding meetings with offi  cers from Foss’s department to “buy time”.112 
Jeff  Kennett was elected Premier of Victoria in October 1992. Kennett was supportive of the EEC directive and 
PM encouraged him to advocate for the weaker European health warnings amongst his political 
counterparts.158, 173 In January 1993, Kennett wrote to all State Governments to confi rm that the Victorian 
Government would be adopting the EEC directive on health warnings.174
A handwritten note by Bible on the status report reads: “Looks like things are deteriorating again. Both W.A. and 
S.A. are dangerous again”.112 Francis sent a memo to Bible the next day as South Australia’s situation required more 
urgent attention.169 Francis stated that he was “still reasonably confi dent of…winning in WA” but if the MCDS 
proposal was to pass in WA and no other state, the “isolation will force WA to adopt the EC Directive”.169 Francis 
informed Bible that “WA & SA are at the top of the list” in terms of priority.169 
The industry was aware of Foss’s tobacco control stance and a few days later, Henry Goldberg (Managing Director, 
PMI, Australia) wrote of WA and Victoria in a memo to Bible, “Even in these two states, where the Premiers are 
onside, they do NOT have control over their Health Ministers”.175 Bible forwarded this memo from his New York 
offi  ce to other senior PM representatives including Murray Bring (Senior Vice President & General Counsel, PM 
Companies Inc.), Craig Fuller (PM Senior Vice President of Corporate Aff airs, PM Companies Inc.), Michael Miles 
(Chief Executive Offi  cer PM before Bible; President and Chief Executive Offi  cer, Kraft General Foods) and William 
Murray (President and Chief Operating Offi  cer, PM Companies Inc.).176
An update on 19 March 1993 informed Bible of Francis’ recent meeting with Maurice Swanson, Director of the 
Health Promotion Services branch of the WA Department of Health to discuss the tobacco industry’s objections to 
the gazetted health warning regulations (see Figure 8).168 Francis considered himself successful in the objectives of 
the meeting “to fi rstly buy time and to secondly, disrupt the existing regulations by forcing amendments”. Francis 
described WA as “taking the lead (among all the States) in drafting uniform regulations”. In response to this, Bible 
wrote [emphasis in original]168:
This doesn’t sound good at all. Especially “WA taking the lead…”.
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
∗  As further information in this report shows, the tobacco industries hopes that the change in government would lessen interest in tobacco 
control were ill-founded.
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Seems: 
1. WA is going ahead with warnings labels despite Court’s assurances.
2. They are taking the lead!! This will spread elsewhere. Don’t want to sound alarmist BUT I am alarmed. Any ideas 
what to do next? My sense is an Industry leader delegation to see Court is our last chance. I’d appreciate your 
views.
“We are still not yet out of  the woods in W.A.”
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Figure 8. Memo regarding meeting between Maurice Swanson (Health Department of Western 
Australia) and Phil Francis (Philip Morris Australia Limited) to discuss Philip Morris’ objections 
to health warning regulations.168
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Matthew Winokur (Director, Corporate Aff airs, PMI) addressed Bible’s concerns in a memo sent on 23 March 1993 
stating177: 
“In brief, the strategy to block the West Australia proposal is threefold. First, to continue to get Kennett 
to push for the EC [ECC] labelling method as an alternative to the West Australia/Ministerial Council 
proposal. He has the eastern State Premiers with him and John Harvey, our political consultant who is close 
to Kennett (ran his successful campaign last fall) is working that route. Second, to see if John Bertrand 
can contact Court in WA to get him to back off . They are sailing friends. These third party initiatives are 
being complemented by the industry work. Phil is taking lead in WA in trying to buy some time. Harvey is 
meeting with David Davies and will also be forwarding an update to me and HP Goldfi eld*, who has been 
helping us on this project as well based in Washington, tomorrow”. 
The same day (23 March 1993), Webb sent a memo titled ‘Australian Health Warnings’ from the PM Asia/Pacifi c 
(Hong Kong) offi  ce to Bible in New York and a copy to Goldberg.178 WA issues dominated the memo which 
documented that PM Corporate Aff airs directors had been meeting with Maurice Swanson “Head of the 
Department of Health” to discuss “the warnings themselves and the logistical diffi  culties posed by implementation 
of the MCDS warnings”.178 Webb reported that Swanson had been “advised by the Health Minister, Foss, to listen 
intently to the industry and report back to him. It seems that the Premier has spoken to the Minister in strong 
terms regarding the industry position”.178 Webb noted that “many meetings” had taken place in WA and the MCDS 
proposal had remained stagnant since the Liberal Party had assumed offi  ce.178 Webb reassured Bible that “there is 
time for further negotiation” as no date had been set for Parliament to reconvene.178 A meeting with the Premier 
was not seen as appropriate until meetings with the Health Minister and his department were completed. Webb 
noted: “the opportunity will come later”.178 The memo concluded, “As you can see, the situation remains very 
fl uid and is continuing to receive the urgent attention of PML management…We shall continue to keep you 
informed”.178 
Bible sent David Davies (Vice President, Corporate Aff airs – Australia, PM Companies Inc. as of February 1993) an 
inter-offi  ce correspondence from the PM USA New York offi  ce on 3 March 1993 detailing “some background from 
my perspective on our Australian business and…the main issues that I think you ought to occupy yourself with 
in Australia”.141 Under the title of “more sensitive issues”, Bible informed Davies “we need to deal with the West 
Australian labelling problem which has some chance of spreading to South Australia and the A.C.T. (Canberra). 
It is imperative that this initiative be stopped”.141 
On 23 April 1993 Webb wrote to Bible179:
“The situation in Western Australia remains diffi  cult because we cannot fi nd the appropriate leads into 
the Premier…I would therefore summarize the situation as still precarious but not deteriorating…All 
concerned in Australia are well aware of the importance of the issue and a considerable amount of eff ort 
has been applied to address the situation” [emphasis in original]. 
Industry suggestions of amendments to the health warning legislation which would eff ectively water down 
the restrictions were set out by Webb in a memo to Bible on 16 July 1993.180 Industry ideas included the “pack 
wrap” concept (i.e., wrapping that may be discarded) and the “plastic reusable cigarette case” (i.e., refi llable 
pack); however, Webb acknowledged that it was “highly unlikely that the regulators will agree to amend” such 
provisions. 
Donna Staunton (Chief Executive Offi  cer TIA) sought advice from law fi rm Clayton Utz regarding possible legal 
grounds for challenging the “proposed Commonwealth tobacco labelling regulations”.181 G. D. Eggleton, Partner 
at Clayton Utz, replied on 16 December 1993 with a discussion of whether the proposed regulations were beyond 
the power of the Trade Practices Act.181 Eggleton concluded that sections of the Act did not justify the proposed 
                                                                                                             
*  H.P. Goldfi eld was a former US Congress member and lobbyist based in Washington, DC. Goldfi eld was noted to be a personal friend of John 
Bertrand.157. Webb WH. Philip Morris Asia/Pacifi c (Hong Kong). Western Australia - health warning regulations. 5 Jan 1993. Philip Morris. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wsi19e00 
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requirement to display information about the “Quit line”[sic] on cigarette packs; however, the requirement to 
display information as to the tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide contents on the side of the pack was justifi ed 
under the Act.181 Eggleton considered the proposed warnings and area of the pack to be occupied by warnings 
to be “reasonably open to argument” as to whether they were “excessive and beyond power”.181 
Industry opposition was eff ective in delaying the introduction of the new warnings. On 8 April 1994 the 
announcement that the WA government had deferred the commencement of labelling regulations from 
1 April 1994 to January 1995 reached Webb and a large distribution list of international PM representatives 
including David Dangoor, Jan Goodheart, Craig Fuller, Henry Goldberg, Murray Bring, Matthew Winokur, 
Nerida White, Ted Lattanzio, Geoff  Bible, Michael Miles and others.182
Generic Packaging
A WA newspaper article (11 Dec 1994) titled “WA Health Minister wants a generic packaging for cigarettes” publicly 
reinforced WA Health Minister Peter Foss’s anti-tobacco stance by reporting on his call for generic packaging for 
tobacco products.183 Foss made the public statement as he unveiled the new series of health warnings which were 
required to be displayed on cigarette packs from 1 January 1995. Foss stated: “I also believe we should be moving 
towards generic packaging for tobacco products. Generic packaging will remove the tobacco industry’s ability to 
promote their products to young people through attractive images and lifestyles”.184 
An R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International document from March 1993 listed the topics of discussions R.J. Reynolds 
engaged in with Rothmans Australia “regarding the primary issues facing the industry in Australia”.185 Topics 
included the “potential for generic packaging ‘only’ to be allowed (Western, Australia)”.185
In a memo outlining the status of pack labelling regulations in Australia in July 1993, David Davies (Vice President 
Corporate Aff airs, PML) informed William Webb that “W.A. and the A.C.T. did attempt, without success, to secure a 
further commitment for generic packaging”.186 Davies further stated186:
 “Recognising that legislation to implement the recommendation will be advanced very quickly in W.A….
we are immediately contacting Health Departments to demand detailed specifi cations for the packaging 
changes on an expedited basis so that we can assess our ability to conform to the required changes in the 
most cost eff ective manner possible. We will also be seeking to secure sunshine clauses in the legislation to 
preclude for as long as possible any further changes to our packaging”.
The PM Asia/Pacifi c three year plan for 1993-1995 stated that “Marketing freedoms are under extreme pressure in 
every important market in the region, and especially in Australia, where the spill-over from generic packaging and 
labelling proposals could impact other markets”.187
A booklet prepared for employees of PML in 1995 identifi ed generic packaging as being considered by some in 
Australia as “the next step”.188 The booklet noted that generic packaging was “being advocated by the Western 
Australian Health Minister and by the Canadian Government”188. 
The federal government decided not to pursue generic packaging in 1995.142, 189
From the authors, recipients and tobacco industry personnel mentioned in the documents, it is clear that the issue 
of strengthened health warnings on cigarette packaging in Australia, with specifi c interest in WA, had the highest 
level of attention within PM. Previous research citing tobacco industry documents confi rms the strong resistance 
of the tobacco companies to Australian moves to implement comprehensive health warnings on cigarette packs.9 
This was at a time when preparations were being made for the BIRC case in WA, another potentially signifi cant 
event for the tobacco industry which received signifi cant attention from senior ranks of PM [Bond, Staff ord & 
Daube in preparation]. 
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3.3.5 Listing Nicotine as a Poison
In October 1995, the WA branch of the AMA in collaboration with ACOSH made a submission to the WA Poisons 
Advisory Committee (PAC) requesting that the exemption for nicotine in tobacco products be lifted from the WA 
Poisons Act.190 Prior to the submission, the media monitoring publication ‘TMA Executive Summary’ reported 
in June 1995 that WA Health Minister Graham Kierath was considering the AMA’s plan to list nicotine under the 
Poisons Act if such a move could be proven to prevent youth smoking.191 Kierath was also reported as considering 
a ban on smoking at such a time when the WA smoking prevalence fell below 10%.191
Tobacco industry media gathering resources monitored the issue in the press. An AMA media release dated 26 
November 1995 signalled the launch of a national campaign by AMA, ASH, ACOSH and the Australian College of 
Paediatrics to have nicotine listed as a poison in the Standard for the Uniform Scheduling of Drugs and Poisons.192 
The media release was sent with a memo the next day from Wills Australia Corporate Aff airs department to a 
distribution list of BATCo staff .193 An ‘Infotopics’ media monitoring report for November 1995 summarised an 
article in The West Australian titled “Doctors seek poison tag on smokes”.51 The article reported on the call from 
the WA branch of the AMA, supported by the WA Health Minister, to address the “historic accident” that allowed 
nicotine in tobacco products to be exempt from Schedule Seven of the poisons listing. 
Communications between Australian tobacco industry representatives190,194-197, primarily from PM, sent in late 1995 
discussed strategies to prevent the listing of nicotine which had the strong support of the WA Health Minister.198 
International tobacco industry correspondence discussed the potential poisons listing which was being debated 
around Australia.199, 200
A WRA ‘privileged and confi dential’ attorney-client communication from December 1995 discussed the campaign 
by the Australian health organisations to declare nicotine as a poison.20, 201 It noted that a submission had been 
made to the WA Health Minister and the PAC, with Kierath having stated that proposals on the topic would be 
considered “favorably”.20 It further noted that the Australian tobacco industry had written to Kierath asking to 
be consulted on the matter.20 WRA assisted the Australian industry with the preparation of response papers.20 
A handwritten notation read, “Roger: I think Canada has recently repeated this approach. Could be helpful in 
Australia”.20
The poisons scheduling of nicotine was discussed as a ‘critical issue’ at an Australian CORA taskforce meeting in 
February 1996 attended by Wills Australia and BAT representatives from Australia, New Zealand, the UK and US.202 
The group’s stated objective was to prevent the scheduling of nicotine in tobacco products. The signifi cance of 
the potential listing was viewed in terms of the “ramifi cations on BAT’s regional and global markets”.202 The report 
stated, “This is part of an international conspiracy to ‘get us’!!!”.202 Strategic options to achieve the objective were 
listed in meeting documents.202 
On 22 June 2000, James Prince (Assistant General Counsel, PM Management Corporation) sent two PM USA 
directors an urgent memo regarding a proposed response prepared by Eric Windholz to the WA Tobacco Action 
Plan which included provisions to “support the scheduling of nicotine in tobacco as a poison”. Urgent comments 
were sought from colleagues.203 
Nicotine in tobacco remains exempt from Schedule Seven of the WA Poisons Act. 
3.3.6 Public and Indoor Smoking Bans
Tobacco industry media monitoring publications communicated WA newspaper coverage of legislative 
attempts to restrict smoking in enclosed public places. The long road to indoor smoking bans in WA provides 
a good example of strategies implemented by the tobacco industry and their allies in the hospitality sector to 
obstruct and weaken legislation. Advocacy for indoor smoking bans anywhere in the world has generally been 
met with strong opposition by the tobacco industry and their allies.204 These industry groups call for policies to 
accommodate smokers and non-smokers using ventilation strategies.205-210 
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Indoor smoking bans were enacted by the Commonwealth in the late 1980s and early 1990s: 
• Commonwealth Department of Health (December 1986)211 followed by Commonwealth departments and 
buildings (March 1988)211
• Buses and coaches registered under the federal Interstate Registration Scheme (1988)212
• Domestic aeroplane fl ights (1987)4 and domestic sectors of international fl ights (September 1990)4
• All fl ights of Australian carriers anywhere in the world4 and on overseas carriers fl ying within Australia (1996). 
Around this time, other public sector organisations became smoke free including the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Australian Federal Police.4 
A SHB ‘current regulatory developments’ report published in October 1994 captured media attention to the 
implementation of a ban on smoking in WA’s home of baseball, Parry Field.213 It was noted as the fi rst time 
smoking had been banned in an outdoor sporting venue in Australia. The report outlined that smoking had also 
been signifi cantly restricted at another major WA sporting venue, Subiaco Oval.213
A Taskforce on Passive Smoking in Public Places was established by the WA Minister for Health, Kevin Prince, in 
August 1996.214 The Taskforce was convened on the basis that “there is now conclusive scientifi c evidence and 
substantial public concern about the health risks for non-smokers exposed to tobacco smoke”.215 In 1997, Labour 
Relations and Health Minister Graham Kierath gazetted regulations to ban smoking in most enclosed workplaces 
from August 1998.216 
The ‘Smoking Issues Status Book Legislative Bulletin’ compiled by the TDC in July 1997 reported on the proposal 
to prohibit smoking in all enclosed workplaces in WA.46 The report noted that WA Premier Richard Court would 
fi nalise the decision on “tough new workplace smoking bans” in WA only after a sub-committee examined the 
report of the passive smoking Taskforce and further consultations were conducted with the hospitality and “other 
aff ected industries”. The media summary mentioned indications that smoking would be banned in all enclosed 
workplaces in WA, including hotels, restaurants and nightclubs (with some exemptions for the latter) from August 
1998 through provisions of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.46 
A report of Taskforce deliberations was published in October 1997.215 A copy of the report is held on the PM 
document archives.217 The Taskforce recommended that “there be a legislative requirement for all enclosed and 
confi ned public places and workplaces in Western Australia to become smoke-free areas from 1 August 1998”.215 
The majority of hospitality venues were to be smoke-free from 1 August 1998. A transition period would be 
granted for bars and lounges where alcohol but not food is served and the BIRC whereby smoking would be 
permitted in limited, separate indoor areas until 1 August 1999.215
The ‘PMI Corporate Aff airs Weekly Highlights’ memo dated August 1997 reported on a survey of the WA public 
commissioned by the AMA which found that 68% of respondents would prefer smoke-free pubs, and 88% of 
respondents believed that all employees should be protected from second-hand smoke.218 The memo noted that 
the survey fi ndings were contradictory to the hospitality industry’s opposition to proposed smoking bans in WA.218
In February 1998, Mary Pottorff  (Director, WRA, PM Management Corporation based in New York) received a fax 
from Donough O’Brien, Chairman Spring O’Brien in London (communications analysis and issue management), 
which noted “it looks as if the Western Australia Hotels Association is conducting a last ditch (and no doubt, 
ill-equipped) campaign to avert a ban” [Note. This document is incorrectly dated 4 Jan; it should read 4 Feb].219 
O’Brien forwarded a note to Pottorff  that he had received from “a young lawyer friend who works in Perth”, Jean-
Pierre Douglas-Henry. It read216: 
“I attach a copy of an article which appeared today in one of the metropolitan daily newspapers relating 
to proposals for smoking in public places in Western Australia. As I understand it, some elements within 
the State Government favour a total ban on smoking in public places. Various interest groups are lobbying 
vigorously against any such move, including the WA Hotels Association and the State’s Tourism Council. If 
you are not already aware of these matters, they may infl uence your thinking about introducing Courtesy 
of Choice in Australia and, in particular, in Western Australia?”. 
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Douglas-Henry attached an article from The West Australian (4 February 1998) titled “Hotels bid to stave off  total 
smoking ban”.216 The opening sentence of the article read “The WA Hotels Association agreed yesterday to accept 
some smoking restrictions in hotels and taverns in a bid to avert a total ban”.216 Regarding the plan to make 
only meal areas in some pubs smoke-free, rather than most enclosed workplaces, the article noted the views 
of WAHA Executive Director Bradley Woods who was summarised as saying: “it was a reasonable and eff ective 
solution which was in the public interest – unlike a blanket ban which he said would devastate the hospitality 
industry”.216 The West Australian article was also summarised in the February 1998 edition of the TDC publication 
Smoking Issues Status Book Legislative Bulletin which covers worldwide legislative issues concerning the tobacco 
industry.220
An article in The West Australian was listed in a daily news bulletin from 9 March 1998 in the BAT document 
archive.221 The article reported that a recently released European study, which apparently found no evidence to 
suggest that passive smoking causes lung cancer, could potentially impact on the WA government’s decision to 
prohibit smoking from all enclosed workplaces from 1 April 1998. A statement from the AMA noted that if the 
reported fi ndings were genuine, they would need to “rewrite all the medical text books”.221 
On 27 April 1998, Mark Friedman (Assistant General Counsel, Legal, PM Management Corporation) sent Mark 
Berlind (Senior Assistant General Counsel, WRA, PM Management Corporation) a memo updating him on the 
WA ETS Taskforce.210 Berlind was reminded that PM had submitted a response to the WA Taskforce report on ETS 
arguing for solutions to accommodate smokers and non-smokers without imposing “unreasonable smoking 
restrictions or bans in public places or the workplace”.210 In the week prior to the communication, the WA Cabinet 
had supported Taskforce recommendations to permit smoking in casinos, bars and clubs, subject to some 
restrictions.210 This created a stand-off  between Cabinet and Labour Relations and Health Minister Graham Kierath, 
as Kierath had intended to ban smoking in hospitality workplaces.210 
Industry awareness of Keirath’s commitment to the legislation was reinforced in a SHB regulatory developments 
report for 15 May 1998 where he was described as “the major proponent” of the proposed legislation.38 In 
response to Bradley Woods’ request on behalf of the WAHA that a two-year delay be granted before bans are 
introduced because “the industry cannot tolerate a workplace smoking ban”, Keirath dismissed any compromise 
stating: “We’re not talking about comfort – we’re talking about a health hazard to employees”.38 With restrictions 
planned to take eff ect 1 August 1998, the WA state cabinet was described as “still divided” with Premier Richard 
Court warning the Legislative Assembly that “there is no way that we can…in practical terms, stop smoking in the 
front public bar”.38 The report noted support for the legislation from the Catering Institute of WA.
The 10 December 1998 edition of ‘Today’s News’ daily media monitoring service (held in the BAT archives) 
summarised an article from The West Australian reporting on tobacco control legislation introduced to WA 
government by the Labor Party (in Opposition at the time), Democrats and Greens which would see smoking 
banned in public places from 29 March 1999, with exemptions given to hotels, restaurants and the BIRC.222 
Exemptions for hospitality venues would be limited to smoking being allowed in one room per venue. Fines were 
to be imposed by local councils who would be required to monitor compliance.222
In February 1999, Denise Keane (Senior Vice President and Associate General Counsel, WRA, PM Management 
Corporation; based in New York) sent correspondence to Murray Bring (Attorney; Vice Chairman, External Aff airs 
and General Counsel, Board of Directors, PM) summarising WRA activities for January 1999.223 Bring was informed 
that WRA had at the request of Corporate Aff airs, “reviewed and commented on” correspondence to “selected” WA 
legislators concerning the ongoing parliamentary debate regarding ETS and smoking restrictions. 
New workplace smoking restrictions were implemented in WA in early 1999.224 The amendments to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Regulations 1996 required that any employee, self-employed person or employer 
must not smoke in an enclosed workplace.225 On 29 March 1999, Health (Smoking in Enclosed Public Places) 
Regulations 1999226 commenced which followed the recommendations of the Taskforce on Passive Smoking 
in Public Places.217 The legislation prohibited smoking in enclosed public places including shopping centres, 
restaurants, food halls and sporting venues.226 Exemptions were allowed for the BIRC, nightclubs, hotels, bars and 
cabarets.226 
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The TMA ‘World Alert’ for 30 August 2000 reported on a concert held by the WA Youth Orchestra titled ‘Smarter 
than smoking babies prom’ to promote smoke-free environments for enjoying music.227 
Media summary publications distributed by the TMA in 2004 and 2005 reported on eff orts by WA health 
organisations and the WA Health Minister to push for further smoking restrictions.50, 228, 229 Jim McGinty, WA Health 
Minister, was noted as confi rming that bans on smoking on beaches, children’s playgrounds and outside offi  ce 
buildings would be considered by the government in late 2004.228 McGinty’s commitment to tobacco control was 
reinforced in his comment that government need not wait for the review of smoking laws scheduled for 2005 to 
ban smoking in pubs and clubs and impose restrictions in outdoor public areas.228 
Stephen Hall, ACOSH Director, and Denise Sullivan, Cancer Council WA spokesperson, publicly supported a move 
by the WA liquor licensing director to prohibit smoking in Perth restaurant Nine Mary’s when it applied for a 
special liquor licence, ahead of the proposed smoking bans in licensed premises to begin from the following 
year.50 The move was considered the fi rst time in Australia that smoking had been banned in a new tavern. Hall 
and Sullivan noted that the decision reinforced community support for smoke-free premises and supported the 
expectation held by many that smoking restrictions would not be a liability for proprietors.50
Advocacy from the WA branch of the AMA for a ban on smoking in cars carrying children was also reported 
in a 2005 TMA media summary with the supporting statement that “although adults are protected from 
environmental tobacco smoke in taxi cabs, children are not given similar legal protection”.229 
3.4 Political Monitoring
The tobacco industry demonstrated a continuing interest in the state and federal political environment in 
Australia. This section serves to illustrate the importance of political relationships to the tobacco industry and 
eff orts to cultivate relationships through fl attery and donations. It should be noted that despite the tobacco 
industry’s eff orts, governments from both sides and politicians from all parties have played signifi cant roles in 
reducing smoking.
In August 1982, Peter Macadam (Chairman, BAT Industries) and Patrick Sheehy (Vice Chairman and Chairman 
designate, BAT Industries) each sent Sir Charles Court, WA Premier until January 1982, a letter230, 231 in response to 
letters Court had previously sent them.232 Macadam thanked Court for attending a BAT meeting and wrote: “It was 
nice to read the kind comments that you made in your letter and I can but say in reply that we felt most honoured 
that you were able to attend our meeting, which allowed us to learn so such about Western Australia and the 
great advances that that part of the world has made under your guidance”.230 Sheehy thanked Court for his letter 
which wished him well on his new appointment (Chairman-designate, BAT Industries) and confi rmed that he 
would try to make arrangements to meet with Court when he was next in WA.231
In a memo to Hamish Maxwell (19 September 1983), Geoff  Bible attributed the increase in SLF in WA from 12.5% 
to 35% to the election of Labor Governments in states and federally.77 Bible noted: “In the past six months with the 
ascendency of the Labor Party into four state governments and the federal Government, the opposition to our 
industry is becoming much more intense than we had anticipated”. The propensity of tobacco control initiatives to 
spread to other states was evidenced in Bible’s reference to the increase of the SLF in Tasmania; “…the precedent 
established by Western Australia and South Australia is what caused them to increase fees”.77 
The memo from Bible gives a noteworthy insight into the signifi cance of the political party in power to the 
tobacco industry.77 Further expressing his distaste for the rise of the Australian Labor Party, Bible noted that the 
Standing Committee of Health Ministers “which is now dominated by Labor Health Ministers” had given the 
tobacco industry “rough treatment” in regard to a revised draft of the voluntary code on advertising he considered 
“unacceptable”. Bible’s position was based on his understanding that the voluntary aspect of the code would be 
removed in favour of government regulation. Bible summarised the recent SLF increases, anti-advertising Bills and 
revised advertising code as a “fairly sudden acceleration of the diffi  culties with which the industry is confronted”.77 
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In the memo, Bible described the Queensland National Party (QNP), in power at the time, as the industry’s “last 
bastion of help”.77 However, it too was under threat with an upcoming “unexpected” election.77 Bible believed 
there was a “reasonable chance” the Labor Party would win power, a situation he saw as a “major setback in our 
industry because his [Joh Bjelke-Petersen’s QNP] Government has been the only Government which has given us 
complete support”. If the Labor Party did come to power, Bible expected they would act on both a SLF and an anti-
advertising Bill for Queensland. Bible requested permission from Maxwell to send a donation on behalf of PM to 
support the QNP, ultimately to protect tobacco industry interests in the state.77 The contribution to the QNP’s state 
electoral campaign fund was requested to be up to AUD$8,000, following 1980 and 1982 donations of $4,000 and 
$6,000 respectively. Bible noted that “political contributions in Australia are legal, customarily are not disclosed 
and are not tax deductible. Such contributions by corporations are customary and are an important part of the 
funding of political campaigns in the country”.77 
A PM ‘weekly highlights’ memo from William Webb to Richard Snyder (PMI) on 6 July 1984 noted the upcoming 
National Conference for the Australian Labor Party.120 Webb wrote “Contacts within the party have told us there 
is no cause for alarm regarding the Party’s attitude to tobacco advertising. Philip Morris has continued to make a 
contact within the State delegations to seek support”.120 
The documents also refl ect the industry’s interest in specifi c appointments of high-ranking health offi  cials. On 18 
February 1993, Phil Francis sent Bible a status report on health warnings and contents labelling.109 Francis wrote: 
“Premier Court’s new Ministry took up offi  ce February 16, Peter Foss a 46 year old Barrister and Solicitor is Minister 
for Health, Arts and Consumer Aff airs. This appointment is considered “reasonable” for the Industry”.109  In a similar 
manner, a TMA ‘World Alert’ publication from 15 November 2000 reported on the appointment of Ian Fletcher as 
the head of the Northern Territory Health Department.233 The report noted that prior to the appointment, Fletcher 
had held senior positions in Richard Court’s government and had been principal of Fletcher Rowe, a Perth-based 
consulting fi rm that had PM as a client.
A May 1994 presentation of the forecast for the Australian Tobacco Business described the political climate as the 
“worst” in WA.234 The presentation, delivered in New York by Henry Goldberg stated: “In relation to our industry, 
Liberal governments vary from the responsible in Victoria to the hysterical in Western Australia”. 
A July 1998 ‘Infotopics’ report noted that Liberal Minister for Labour Relations Graham Kierath had introduced 
regulations to ban smoking in all workplaces, regulations which reportedly did not have the support of other 
government members.235 The report stated that Kierath risked being demoted because he “snubbed protocol by 
refusing to sign off  amendments to watered down antismoking regulations”.235 
The tobacco documents provide clear evidence that the companies were concerned to ensure regular political 
monitoring and well as media monitoring. This related to both general trends and specifi c issues, such as health 
warnings and further curbs on advertising and promotion.
3.4.1 Political Donations
A TMA ‘World Alert’ publication from 29 September 2004 featured a summary of an article from The West Australian 
which reported that ACOSH and the WA branches of the National Heart Foundation and Cancer Council had called 
on the Labor and Liberal parties to redirect donations they have accepted from tobacco companies to public 
hospital patients suff ering an illness caused by smoking.236
In one fi nancial year (2002-03), the Federal Labor and Liberal parties were reported to have received a total of 
almost AUD $100,000 from tobacco companies.145, 236, 237 At the WA State level, the parties had accepted AUD 
$5,000 each.238-242 The West Australian article noted that the Federal and WA State Labor parties had announced 
their decision not to accept any future donations from tobacco-related companies.236 Political donations have 
been a well-recognised form of lobbying for a long time; however, as of 2008, the Australian Labor Party, 
Australian Greens and Australian Democrats have recognised the inappropriateness of accepting tobacco 
company donations and have formally refused to do so.243 
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3.5 Public Education Campaigns
During 1983 and 1984, representatives of PML including Geoff  Bible and Jack Sporton sent regular “weekly 
highlights” memos to Hamish Maxwell in the PM New York offi  ce.73, 137 In one memo dated 29 July 1983, Bible 
informed Maxwell of the three year, $6 million anti-smoking campaign planned by the WA government, to be 
funded by the 25 cent increase in the SLF.73 At the time of the memo, Premier Burke had opened the campaign 
with advertisements aimed at preventing youth smoking.73 The Tobacco Institute later made a formal complaint to 
the Advertising Standards Council over the WA government advertising relating to juvenile smoking.111
By late September 1983, evidence of the success of recent tobacco control initiatives had surfaced.114 Bible 
considered the increase of the SLF to 35% and the “heavy” anti-smoking campaign implemented by the 
government to be “major contributing factors” to the fall in sales of 15% to 20% in WA.114 While Bible conceded 
that the fi gures may have been an exaggeration, he described the trend as “nevertheless very worrying”.114 
WA’s fi rst smoke free day campaign - the ‘Give it away for a day’ campaign - was held in November 1982.244 The 
campaign, initiated by the National Heart Foundation, facilitated the establishment of the Quit Campaign.4 
A Campbell-Johnson Limited media monitoring report245 from December 1983 summarised an article from the 
British Medical Journal which reported that the annual ‘Great American Smokeout’ encouraged WA to hold its 
smoke free day.246 It was noted that more people gave up for the day in WA compared to the US, but a similar 
number remained smoke free.245 
Print-media monitoring publication ‘BATCo Press Cuttings’ featured an article from The News & Travel from May 
1984 titled ‘WA takes on cigarette companies at own game’.19 The article detailed the move by the WA government 
to “turn its anti-smoking campaign into an unprecedented multi-million-dollar programme of behaviour 
modifi cation”. The fi rst stage of the $6 million campaign was television, radio and newspaper anti-smoking 
advertisements, described as “the most intensive behaviour modifi cation programme of its type attempted 
anywhere in the world”. The article noted that the state levy applied to cigarettes in WA made them the most 
expensive in Australia at the time. 
The BAT document archive features a BBC Broadcast report on a program aired in April 1984 which reported 
on the tobacco control movement in WA including BUGA UP (Billboard Utilising Graffi  tists Against Unhealthy 
Promotions) and the Labor governments anti-smoking campaign.247 Premier Burke outlined the “very 
comprehensive anti-smoking campaign” targeted at youth which was funded by the increased excise on tobacco 
products.247 A letter of complaint followed the broadcast from the London-based Tobacco Advisory Council due to 
the unbalanced portrayal of BUGA UP activities which they feared would entice similar behaviour in the UK.248
The July 1985 edition of the New York State Journal of Medicine featured an article titled “Western Australia gives 
health promotion the nod”.249 The three year ‘Smoking and Health Project’ (later renamed the Quit Campaign) 
which was to receive $6 million of earmarked tobacco taxes was described as “the world’s wealthiest anti-smoking 
program per capita”.249 The project targeted children experimenting with smoking through a comprehensive 
educational mass media campaign. The article outlined the disparity between the advertising budget of tobacco 
companies, $5 per Australian, and the budget for anti-smoking advertising, 80 cents per Australian.249 
The WA Smoking and Health Project was further discussed in a 1988 trip report by Swedish scientist Ragnar 
Rylander (see section on Ragnar Rylander below).250 Rylander noted that about AUD$90,000 was available in 1988 
to fund grants for smoking cessation programmes, community education and policy development.250 
The PM archives hold a letter from Maurice Swanson, Director of Health Promotion Services, to the Chief Executive 
Offi  cer of PM Companies Inc. in New York.251 The letter was to notify the owner of the copyright for Marlboro 
cigarette advertising materials that television advertisements reproducing these copyrighted materials would 
be broadcast “for public health education purposes” throughout WA in 1994. David Davies’ weekly report on 
Australian issues in June 1994 informs the international list of PM representatives of the WA Department of 
Health’s advertising campaign featuring the Marlboro advertisements and Davies’ request for copies of the 
materials.252
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The participation of former cigarette models in Quit campaign advertisements produced in WA was reported in 
the June 1994 edition of the ACOSH newsletter which is held in the BAT document archive.253 The advertisements 
featured the slogan “Don’t get sucked in” and were aired in various Australian states. 
An ‘Infotopics’ media monitoring report summarised a September 1996 article from The West Australian 
regarding interest from the Indonesian Network of Women Against Tobacco in using WA tobacco control 
strategies as a “model for action” against cigarette manufacturers in Indonesia.254 The group planned to use the 
Quit advertisements from the WA Department of Health in Indonesia, with particular interest in the tar lung 
advertisement. 
3.5.1 Youth Smoking Prevention
An April 1983 status report on “anti-industry activities” in Australia prepared for PM provided a state and federal 
update on government members tobacco stance and tobacco control initiatives.72 The document reports that 
legislation was being drafted in WA to increase fi nes for selling cigarettes to minors. 
An ACOSH media release from 20 December 1988 titled ‘Children like cigarette ads better than other ads’ was 
retrieved from the PM archives.255 The media release details research fi ndings of a survey of 300 school children 
aged between 10 and 15 years. The study examined compliance with the voluntary cigarette advertising code 
administered by the Advertising Standards Bureau and assessed the appeal of tobacco product advertisements to 
children. Ruth Shean, Director of ACOSH at the time, stated “…underneath there must be enormous satisfaction 
about the success of their marketing strategies as shown by our research”.255 In the study eight out of ten 
adolescents recognised the cigarette advertisements, compared to seven and two out of ten who recognised the 
jeans and drink advertisements, respectively.255 Further, 87% of participants thought the model in the cigarette 
advertisement was under 25 which was in breach of the voluntary advertising code.255 
In contrast, an ‘Infotopics’ media monitoring report from July 1990 summarised the results of a youth survey from 
Perth newspaper, the Sunday Times.256 The survey of WA students found that “alcohol and cigarette advertising do 
not have a major eff ect on most young people in Australia”. 
‘Infomat’, a customised information service257 contracted by BAT258 summarised a newspaper article in The 
Australian from 1 Oct 1993 alongside articles from Denmark, Sweden and UK.259 The article reported on a study 
conducted by the WA Department of Health which found that a new cigarette brand which was named ‘Harley 
Davidson’ that featured a motorbike insignia on its packaging appealed to youth. AMA WA President Dr Keith 
Woollard noted that Winfi eld’s sports sponsorship was a responsible factor in the brands popularity with under-
age smokers.259 The report noted that 40% of cigarettes sold to youth were from vending machines and that youth 
preferred brands with well known logos.
Information about WA youth smoking prevention campaigns was also gathered at international health 
conferences.260 R.J. Reynolds representatives summarised the presentations given at an October 1993 meeting of 
the American Public Health Association which included a session titled “Western Australia Smoking-Prevention 
Campaign Targeting Youth 9 to 12”.260 The session covered Australian tobacco control legislation, anti-smoking 
campaigns and details of “The Big Smoke” youth smoking prevention campaign.
A PM Corporate Aff airs global ‘weekly highlights’ update from late September 1994 reported on the WA youth 
smoking prevention program titled ‘Inter Galactic SmokeWatch’.261 Under the heading ‘Australian Advocacy 
Initiative’, the report listed the campaign developed by the WA branch of the National Heart Foundation which 
was soon to be introduced into 800 WA schools. 
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3.6 Tobacco Industry Funded Scientists and Research
3.6.1 Ragnar Rylander
Ragnar Rylander, Professor of Environmental Medicine at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, spent a 
sabbatical month at the University of Western Australia in February 1988. It was unknown at the time that 
Rylander held a generously-funded consultancy role with PM.262 Until Rylander’s long-standing association 
with PM was discovered in internal tobacco industry documents released as part of the MSA,262 the deception 
of the academic and scientifi c community in WA and beyond had been maintained. During the 1980s and 
1990s, Rylander met with and worked alongside many respected WA academic and scientifi c individuals and 
organisations, including the Institute for Child Health Research.263 
Rylander prepared a report for PM documenting his 1988 visit, titled ‘Smoking and health activities in Western 
Australia’ (see Figure 9).250 The cover of the report reads “For the confi dential use of Dr T .S. Osdene and associates 
only”.250 Dr Thomas S. Osdene was the Director of Science and Technology at PM USA.264 Osdene received the 
report on 13 April 1988 with a memo from Rylander which read: “I hope the material is to your satisfaction”.264 In 
the memo, Rylander also suggested future dates to “further discuss the Australian experience”.264
The report documents Rylander’s views on the state of tobacco control in WA. Rylander’s report contained 
observations regarding the legislative process in Australia: “A special situation exists in Australia in that legislation 
of various kinds can be put in force although no regular hearings have been made”.250 He further observed the 
typical spread of tobacco control initiatives between states: “Once legislation is introduced in one state, there is 
also a strong tendency for others to follow…”.250 Rylander noted that WA did not receive economic incentives from 
the tobacco industry, as the state’s fi nancial emphasis was on industry, mining and agriculture other than tobacco 
growing. 
Regarding tobacco control advocates Rylander reported: “The local scenery is characterised by the presence of 
a very active anti-smoking public health offi  cer (Michael Dob) [sic], seconded by his wife Ruth Sheun [sic]”.250 
Rylander credited the “presence of a strong power connected to the Minister of Health, together with the 
absence of an economical linkage with the tobacco industry” for the “broad and far reaching measures aimed 
at counteracting tobacco smoking” that WA had adopted.250 Further emphasising the willingness of the WA 
government to act on behalf of the public’s health, Rylander wrote “The Health Department of Western Australia, 
under the initiative of Michael Dob [sic], pushes an active programme for smoking control initiatives”.250 The report 
referred to tobacco control initiatives advocated by the WA Department of Health and health groups including 
taking over “the role of the tobacco industry as promotors [sic] for sporting events” and banning cigarette 
advertising.250 
Rylander discussed the debate in Australia regarding the acceptance of research funding from the Australian 
Tobacco Research Foundation, an organisation Rylander described as “an independent research body with 
high quality researchers on its advisory board”.250 Rylander wrote that “the current view is that tobacco industry 
related money should not be accepted”. He stated: “Much of the imbalance in the present situation in Western 
Australia is due to the heavy impact of the Health Department and the absence of a balanced scientifi c impact”.250 
Rylander called for further “basic research on tobacco and health related problems” and funding for such research 
activities.250 
Appended to the report was a list of “persons with whom discussion were held”. The list features tobacco industry 
affi  liates, Blair Hunt (Tobacco Institute, Sydney), Brian T. Wilson (Tobacco Institute, Clayton Utz), W. Allan Crawford 
(Consultant, Sydney), J. R. Johnstone (University of Western Australia), and a respected health representative, 
Maurice Swanson (Health Department of Western Australia). 
Inter-offi  ce correspondence from Charles R. Wall (PM Companies Inc. based in New York) to Murray H. Bring on 
23 July 1992 discussed the dissemination of research funding for 1993 in various countries.265 Under the heading 
of “Philip Morris USA”, the memo stated “Philip Morris maintains consultancies with…Ragnar Rylander….our 
relationship with Ragnar Rylander has proved benefi cial to the Company, and should continue, i.e., $150,000 per 
year”. 
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Rylander’s relationship with PM continued into the 1990s where it remained covert. Rylander documented his 
trip to Perth in February and March 1998 in a report to Richard Carchman, Vice President of PM Scientifi c Aff airs.263 
Rylander’s activities appear to be focussed around highlighting and establishing credibility for alternative causes 
of respiratory symptoms caused by smoking including exposure to moulds and organic dusts.263 Rylander wrote 
about “useful” discussions with Worksafe WA where he reported results from “our ETS and population study” (‘our’ 
possibly referring to PM funding) which “clearly demonstrated the importance of dietary factors which infl uence 
disease risks”.263 Regarding Worksafe WA’s activities, Rylander reported “The emphasis on ETS in the work of the 
Agency is less pronounced compared to a few years ago and it is now concentrating on a program for education 
on Internet. I have volunteered to write about organic dusts and also about indoor environments with particular 
emphasis on mold exposures”.263 
Rylander met with the WA branch of the Australian Thoracic Society and reported that “the concept that molds 
indoors is an important factor for childrens’ disease is gaining acceptance”.263 Rylander engaged in discussions 
with the Institute for Research on Child Health where he was updated on research relating to children’s immune 
function.263 He believed the information could be applied to a forthcoming workshop and research on children 
and mold in indoor air. In summary, Rylander described his trip to WA as “a very worthwhile visit in spite of the 
endless hours on diff erent airplanes”.263
The PM collection of tobacco industry documents contains records of correspondence between Rylander and 
Martin McKee, Editor in Chief of European Journal of Public Health (EJPH), dated between June 2000 and March 
2001. The correspondence concerned Rylander’s potential confl ict of interest in authoring a paper published 
in the EJPH in 1999 regarding the potential confounder of diet in studies of second-hand smoke health risks.266 
McKee highlights concerns with Rylander’s independence in light of the internal PM documents publicly available 
as a result of the MSA. A substantial number of documents evidence Rylander’s signifi cant involvement with PM 
and tobacco industry-funded organisations.267 McKee and Anita Kallin (Managing editor of EJPH) maintained 
pressure on Rylander for full disclosure and explanation of his links with PM.267, 268 McKee requested267:
“…full details of all payments received from the tobacco industry or from organisations receiving funding 
from the industry since 1970 so that our readers can make an informed judgement on your comments. 
In particular, you may wish to refer to correspondence with Thomas Osdene and, more recently, with 
Margaret Opocensky, at Philip Morris”. 
The debate was also played out in the editorial and letters sections of the EJPH.269-271 Unsatisfi ed with Rylander’s 
explanation, McKee stated in a letter to Rylander on 28 November 2000272: 
“I regret that I feel that your letter falls far short of a full statement of competing interests. Specifi cally, you 
have not indicated the precise scale of the payments. As I indicated previously I have not yet had time to 
go through all 16,000 documents in which you are referred to on the Philip Morris website but it is not 
clear to me how what you describe as a “salary for one technician and materials” relates, for example, to the 
confi dential report that you wrote for Dr Osdene about “smoking and health activities in Western Australia” 
in April 1988. I would welcome your comments on precisely what that report sought to achieve”. 
Rylander responded in a three-page letter to McKee on 18 December 2000273: 
“While I consider that your fi rst reaction in the Journal, particularly in view of the comments from Dr Hedley 
[letter to editor269], were appropriate. I think that you have now moved into a rather inquisition-like mood…
After travel, funded by Philip Morris, it is obviously appropriate to write a report on experience collected”. 
On 6 February 2001, McKee wrote to Rylander noting that there were “…questions that remain outstanding, such 
as your response to my queries on the report you wrote on smoking activities in Western Australia”.274 McKee 
noted that it would be appropriate to involve the journal’s ombudsman in order to resolve the situation.274 
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Rylander returned to Perth in March 2001. His trip report which is held in the PM archives, described the purpose 
of the trip as being to “accumulate recent information on mechanisms responsible for airways infl ammation” and 
“the importance of environmental sampling procedures”.275 His time in Perth was mostly spent at the Institute 
for Child Health Research. Rylander noted having collaborated with the Institute for more than 25 years and 
commended their “outstanding record”. Rylander sent the trip report to Richard Solana of PM Worldwide Scientifi c 
Aff airs on 16 March 2001.276
The health professionals and organisations Rylander visited in WA, and indeed the international scientifi c and 
health community were largely unaware of Rylander’s signifi cant ties to PM and tobacco industry-funded 
organisations until the many thousands of internal tobacco industry documents were made publicly available as 
a result of US litigation.277 After conducting an enquiry into Rylander’s associations,262 the University of Geneva 
concluded that Rylander was “guilty of scientifi c misconduct in hiding the real extent of his links with the tobacco 
industry and in aligning his activity as a scientifi c investigator and expert with the strategic objectives of his 
industrial sponsors”.262, 277 The scientifi c deception characterised by Rylander and sponsored by PM provides a 
local example of the nature of tobacco industry strategies implemented in WA. It demonstrates the extent to 
which tobacco companies are prepared to go to secure information and promote misinformation to further their 
business objectives.
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Figure 9. Trip report by Ragnar Rylander: ‘Smoking and health activities in Western Australia’.250
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3.7 Litigation
3.7.1 Burswood International Resort Casino
In December 1992, BIRC employees and the WA Department of Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare launched 
a case against BIRC management to hold them accountable for not adequately protecting employees from 
second-hand smoke.278 The litigation was the fi rst of its kind in WA and held the potential to set an international 
precedent for legislation on indoor smoking. 
Tobacco industry documents provide evidence that PM demonstrated an active interest and involvement in the 
defence of the BIRC. Handwritten notes on a memo sent in January 1993 by Geoff  Bible, Managing Director of PMI 
in New York at the time, represent the beginning of PM’s involvement in the BIRC case.279 The memo documents 
Bible’s off er for PM and their US law fi rm SHB to assist BIRC in their defence: “It’s these types of cases that blindside 
us. I think we should pull out all stops to help [the] defendant”.279 
PM’s investment in the BIRC defence demonstrated the industry’s recognition of the potential signifi cance of the 
case beyond WA. Tobacco industry law fi rms assisted the BIRC defence in the recruitment of witnesses. The PM 
legal department’s “privileged and confi dential” fi ve year plan (1994-1998) outlined the company’s involvement 
in assisting BIRC with its defence.280 Media statements reporting on both the ‘win’281and ‘loss’ scenarios282 were 
drafted by PM and the TIA before the Magistrate’s decision was announced. The statements were reviewed by 
international tobacco industry executives including Charles R. Wall (Vice President and Associate General Counsel, 
PM Companies Inc.)283 and were circulated “far and wide”.284 
Magistrate R.J. Gething delivered the court’s fi nal decision on 17 September 1993; “My initial persuasion is 
confi rmed and I fi nd at this point that the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that ETS causes 
harm to health and therefore has not proved that the defendant has failed in its duty not to expose its employees 
to risk as alleged”.285 The decision noted that even during the busiest times at the BIRC, the second-hand smoke 
levels present would not pose a health risk to BIRC employees.286
WA was launched into the international tobacco industry spotlight for a signifi cant period of 1993 due to PM’s 
involvement. The Burswood decision was further disseminated to all PM USA and PMI regional and Corporate 
Aff airs directors by Jan Goodheart, Manager of WRA, PM Asia in October 1993. Goodheart encouraged PM staff  to 
distribute the decision throughout their regions, a request which would see the BIRC case publicised as widely as 
the EEC, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa, USA, Asia, Japan and Latin America.287
The involvement of PM in the BIRC defence allowed the tobacco industry to build the trust of the WA hospitality 
industry and foster an alliance with the AHA. The internal industry documents reveal that the BIRC litigation 
received the highest level of attention from senior staff  of PMI New York, further illustrating the potential 
signifi cance of the case beyond WA. The case stimulated interest in WA as a setting for consequential debate on 
smoking issues and illustrated the tobacco industry’s progression of interest in WA. 
A comprehensive chronology and analysis of the tobacco industry’s interest in the BIRC litigation is available in a 
paper by Bond, Staff ord and Daube [in preparation]. 
3.7.2 Recovering Health Care Costs
Following billion-dollar payouts by tobacco companies to US State governments to cover smoking-related 
health care costs,288 the WA State government considered undertaking similar legal action.289 Media monitoring 
documents captured WA media attention to this potential action and made it accessible to international tobacco 
executives.44, 45 For example, the ‘TDC Newsround: bulletin of regulatory & media issues’ published in late March 
1997 summarised an article in The Weekend Australian (22 March 1997) which reported that the AMA had urged 
state and federal governments to sue Australian tobacco companies in an eff ort to recover smoking-related health 
care costs45. The article described government Ministers’ responses to the proposal as “muted”; however, WA 
Health Minister Kevin Prince was said to have called on tobacco companies to “make a substantial allocation” of 
funds for a public education programme drawing attention to the health eff ects of smoking.45 
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Over a year later, the ‘Fiscal Bulletin’ published by the TDC in July 1998 summarised an article in The West Australian 
(13 June 1998) which reported that the WA State government was considering suing the tobacco companies for 
up to AUD$36 million a year to recover the health care costs of “victims of smoking”.44 Kevin Prince was quoted 
as saying “The feasibility of litigation against tobacco companies for tobacco-related health costs has been and 
continues to be the subject of consideration”. The signifi cant fi nancial payouts in the US were suggested to have 
inspired the WA government’s consideration of legal action. The article featured a claim by a spokesman for Wills 
Australia that smokers already pay taxes in excess of ‘alleged’ health costs of smoking.44
Discussions regarding the consideration to take legal action against the tobacco companies continued through 
2000. A ‘World Alert’ published by the TMA in late March 2000 reported that representatives of the Australian 
states would meet the following day to consider litigation against the cigarette companies to recover costs 
incurred in the treatment of smoking-caused illnesses.290 The potential for legal action to be based on a fi nding 
of negligence of the cigarette manufacturers was acknowledged. Tobacco industry representatives’ responses to 
potential litigation were presented. Eric Windholz, spokesman for PML stated that Australia’s strict controls on the 
tobacco industry acted to limit the States’ grounds for litigation; “actions of the nature being contemplated have 
poor prospects of success”.290 The Corporate and Regulatory Aff airs Director of BAT Australia, Brendan Brady, stated 
“We will fi ght it with some vigour, and we will certainly not settle”.290 
Following consideration by the States and Attorney Generals, it was decided that they would not proceed and the 
Australian litigation never came to fruition. 
3.7.3 Other Litigation
The media monitoring publications captured reports on other WA litigation involving tobacco companies. Under 
the section ‘ETS/IAQ litigation not involving cigarette manufacturers’, the ‘Current Regulatory Developments 
Report’ published by SHB on 9 March 2001 summarised The West Australian articles (21 and 22 February 2001) 
regarding the Bunbury United soccer club which had been charged with allowing patrons to smoke during 
events held at the club. The trial was considered to be the fi rst prosecution test case under WA’s antismoking 
legislation.291
Potential WA litigation in the tobacco industry’s favour was reported in a ‘Daily Executive Summary’ published 
by the TMA in September 2003.292, 293 On 1 September, the High Court of Australia ruled that BAT had the right to 
pursue legal action to recover nearly AUD$7 million worth of tobacco licence fees the tobacco company had paid 
the WA Government. BAT claimed that excise duties imposed by the WA State government contravened section 
90 of the Commonwealth Constitution.294 The High Court’s decision only dealt with the right to proceed; the 
WA Supreme Court was to decide on the legal merits of the case and whether the money would be returned to 
BAT.294 A spokesman for State Attorney-General Jim McGinty said the government planned to defend against any 
litigation actioned by BAT.292 The High Court ruled that the WA government had invalidly imposed the taxes on 
BAT.294
3.8 Health Organisations
Media coverage of tobacco issues has often reported on the tobacco control eff orts of WA health organisations 
and featured quotes from a spokesperson from one or more of the organisations.32, 50, 295 Health groups in WA 
have regularly worked together to advocate for tobacco control initiatives. Health organisations work hard to put 
health issues, and particularly tobacco control, on the agenda of decision makers. One strategy for maintaining 
the visibility of tobacco issues is continued media coverage of smoking related issues and proposed control 
measures. Not only do the public and decision makers view this media, but as outlined earlier, the tobacco 
industry employs comprehensive media gathering methods to ensure they are kept abreast of tobacco-related 
international media coverage. The information gathered identifi es the WA health advocates who pose a threat to 
the tobacco industry. 
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The main WA health organisations mentioned in the industry documents include:
• WA Department of Health
• ACOSH
• AMA WA branch
• Cancer Council WA
• National Heart Foundation WA branch
Examples of attention to these organisations include:
A facsimile copy of an AMA WA pamphlet titled “Your Family at Risk? A Warning from Your Doctor” was held in 
the PM archive, sent by R.J. Reynolds Australia in late 1990.296 The pamphlet details the dangers of second-hand 
smoke and promotes smoke-free areas. The publication was a joint project of AMA WA, ACOSH, National Heart 
Foundation and the Health Promotion Services Branch of the Health Department of WA.
A copy of the June 1994 edition of the ACOSH newsletter: ‘Smoking or Health’, was found within the BAT 
archives.253 The newsletter reported on the AMA’s ‘tobacco scoreboard’ which ranked WA “as having the best 
record of any State or Territory government on discouraging smoking”. The tobacco industry was again informed 
of the WA government being rated the ‘best promoter of tobacco control programs’ in 1999 in the TMA ‘World 
Alert’ publication on 8 June 2000.297
ACOSH received further industry attention in 1997 when the TMA ‘Executive Summary’ media monitoring 
publication summarised an article in The West Australian (13 June 1997) which reported that ACOSH “will 
reportedly sue tobacco companies on behalf of 500,000 smokers under the age of 21”.298
Information retrieved from international tobacco industry documents’ regarding WA health organisations has 
been discussed in the other sections of this monograph. A comprehensive research paper covering internal 
tobacco document information on WA health organisations is planned to follow this monograph. 
3.8.1 Seventh World Conference on Tobacco & Health
In April 1990, WA hosted the Seventh World Conference on Tobacco & Health (WCTH). Tobacco document research 
conducted by Muggli and Hurt13 provides evidence that the tobacco industry have gone to signifi cant lengths to 
undermine tobacco control conferences. The internal tobacco documents further reveal the interest shown by the 
tobacco industry in the 1990 Seventh WCTH held in Perth. This was the fi rst conference the tobacco industry was 
specifi cally excluded from.
The Seventh WCTH was listed in industry calendars of signifi cant tobacco control meetings for 1990.299, 300 Offi  cial 
conference publications are held within the document archives including the registration book300-302, conference 
proceedings303 and additional conference information supplied by the organisers.304
Communications were exchanged prior to the conference between representatives of the tobacco industry 
and related organisations based in Australia and internationally. David Bacon (Wills Australia) sent a memo in 
December 1989 to Bob Ely (BAT Public Aff airs Executive UK; INFOTAB Board of Directors; ICOSI Member) with an 
attached media release publicising the conference scheduled for April 1990.305 The media release described the 
conference as “considered to be among the most prestigious health conferences in the world”. 
A letter dated January 1990 from Leonard S. Zahn (representing Leonard Zahn and Associates PR counsel located 
in New York) to Sharon Boyse (BAT located in London) noted that after reviewing the conference information, 
Zahn had decided not to attend, “There is so little real science on the program that we feel the trip would be a 
waste of time and money…we’d feel guilty about doing it under the guise of a meeting devoted almost entirely to 
propaganda and antismoking activities”.306 
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On 24 July 1989, A.D.C. Turner (Deputy Chief Executive of the Tobacco Advisory Counsel located in London) 
sent a letter to members of the Public Relations Committee and Scientifi c Committee regarding the conference 
programme. Turner stated: “Note the same cast of characters and the ironic title of David Simpson’s address: “What 
the industry would say if it were here”. Since we have been excluded, deliberately, I fi nd that particular talk-title 
peeving”.307 Documents relating to David Simpson’s presentation are available in the industry document archives.16 
Turner continued307:
“I see that David Abbott [Chairman of UK advertising agency Abbott Mead Vickers] is to be over there, 
no doubt presenting his well worn diatribe; it would be interesting to observe whether he will declare 
his Agency’s health care accounts. Dr Everett Koop is to speak at the opening ceremony, so I am sure the 
delegates will be given a forceful charge at the start. By the end of the conference they will need one of the 
optional tours!”. 
In March 1990, INFOTAB provided briefi ng documents to an international distribution of tobacco company and 
NMA personnel.308 Attached to a memo detailing conference monitoring arrangements was a document titled 
“Background materials for enquiries received during the Seventh World Conference on Tobacco and Health”.309 The 
document lists prepared responses to questions relating to youth smoking, second-hand smoke health risks and 
the economic benefi ts of tobacco growing. 
Another attachment titled “Set of texts on the importance and impact of the world tobacco trade: For media use” 
states: “Its good to know that the zealots of the consumerist movement now meeting in Perth, Western Australia 
(at the luxurious Sheraton Hotel), are not so dedicated to the destruction of smokers that they have forgotten how 
to enjoy themselves”.310 The document goes on to describe the social programme of the conference and noted: 
“And who will pay for all this jollity? Why, the consumer, of course”. The remaining two pages of the document 
emphasise the importance of tobacco to the world economy.310 These points are further detailed in a third 
attachment titled “The socio-economic importance of tobacco to developing countries and the implications if 
their tobacco industries are jeopardised”.311
Despite the exclusion of the tobacco industry from the conference, tobacco companies received detailed 
conference monitoring reports from INFOTAB.312-317 Monitoring reports summarised individual sessions of the 
conference and noted details including speakers, the number of delegates attending and which organisations 
they represented, and a summary of the speaker’s key comments. A copy of the resolutions from the Seventh 
WCTH were distributed by INFOTAB.318
The transcript of the speech presented by Professor Stanton Glantz at the Perth conference is held on the 
document archives.319 Sections of the transcript are underlined, including “one of the greatest assets we have 
stumbled onto in the fi ght over smoking is the non-smokers”, “the same ideas a few of us were advocating in 1983 
which were viewed as so strange, radical and hopeless have now really become very mainstream” and “you need 
to convince legislators that if they oppose you they would be perceived as dupes of the cigarette companies”.319 
Transcripts of other presentations are also held on the document archives300, 320 and were distributed widely to 
international tobacco company executives.321 
The TMA produced a ‘special report’ on the conference which provided a detailed synopsis of information the 
TMA gathered from the conference.322 The ‘special report’ contained excerpts of speeches, summaries of tobacco 
control plans presented at the conference and the conference programme.322 The conference outcomes were also 
reported in an R.J. Reynolds biweekly status report distributed in April 1990.323 
A summary of the Seventh WCTH was prepared by John Bloxcidge (Chief Executive, INFOTAB) for a tobacco 
industry-sympathetic audience.324, 325 Bloxcidge described the WCTH as “the anti-smoking Olympics” and noted 324:
“The atmosphere of the whole event was enormously self-congratulatory. These people talk of nothing 
but anti-tobacco activities, day and night. They listen to each other’s (really boring) speeches, the endless 
repetition of old arguments, the recycling of tired research, the gross exaggerations. Then they applaud like 
mad - up to two minute ovations for leading fi gures like Pertschuk, Daube and Nakajima”.
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In the summary, Bloxcidge made observations regarding the tone and topics of presentations and reproduced the 
most animated quotes made by presenters. Rather than commenting on the scientifi c accuracy of presentations, 
Bloxcidge described presenters or their research as “hysterical”, “wilder”, “aggressive”, “outrageous” and 
“incompetent”.324 A few presenters received compliments in the summary; Michael Pertschuk was described as 
“one of the star performers on the activist front bench” and Dr Judith Mackay was noted as “a strong candidate for 
the ‘best speaker’ award”.324 The summary ended with an acknowledgement to representatives of the TIA for their 
“valuable support and advice” and the note: “Many specifi c industry/Infotab actions are now required as a result of 
new knowledge gained in Perth”.324 
Tobacco control researchers who presented at the Seventh WCTH were noted in documents written after the 
conference.326, 327 ‘Infotopics’ published an article on the conference in its April 1990 edition.326 The article was 
compiled using “reports INFOTAB prepared in monitoring the conference”.326 Key conference resolutions were 
noted along with summaries of the paper presented by Dr Richard Peto and Dr Alan Lopez, and the launch of the 
Trade for Life campaign and GLOBALink by the American Cancer Society. The article listed 19 presentations as 
being available from INFOTAB. 
Statements made by presenters at the Seventh WCTH urging action against ETS were used by INFOTAB to 
highlight the need for an organised industry response to ETS issues in a publication regarding an industry 
campaign titled “Seizing the initiative”. The campaign aimed to support INFOTAB members to be pro-active in 
addressing ETS issues.327 The central strategy of the campaign was noted as: “to establish both a credibility and 
acceptance of balanced scientifi c evidence presented by the industry on the issue of ETS”.327
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4.0 Conclusions
It is clear from the available tobacco industry documents that the international tobacco industry has displayed 
signifi cant levels of interest in WA over many years – since the 1950s.
Tobacco company executives have been most concerned about WA in terms of:
• Restrictions on tobacco advertising and sponsorship
• Taxation of tobacco products
• Health warnings and pack labelling of tobacco products
• Litigation involving tobacco companies or their allies
• Industry funded scientist’s visits to WA
• Changes to tobacco control legislation
• Monitoring of health organisations and tobacco control advocates
• Monitoring of politicians and political parties 
• Regulation of cigarette ingredients
• Regulations around smoke-free areas
• Public education campaigns 
What can be learned from looking back on the tobacco industry’s interest in WA?
History and experience show that the tobacco control initiatives contested most vigorously by tobacco companies 
are those they know will have the greatest impact on their sales and profi ts. It is encouraging that WA features 
prominently in industry documents, suggesting that tobacco control initiatives in this State have been successful 
in focussing on those areas most likely to cause concern to the major companies.
The documents also illustrate the signifi cant concern shown by the industry about the potential for tobacco 
control initiatives to spread beyond the areas in which they originated. Successful initiatives in WA and other 
Australian states have been taken up internationally. This is testament to the advocates in WA whose work started 
some decades ago, to decision makers whose local eff orts have had a signifi cant fl ow-on eff ect, and to the very 
proper judgement of tobacco company executives that their failures here have led to success elsewhere. 
Limitations of the current research
This monograph provides a comprehensive overview of international interest in WA and provides many 
interesting insights into the tobacco industry’s view of WA and Australia. However, some limitations of the current 
research are acknowledged. 
The online document archives host many more documents regarding WA and Australia which were only sent 
within Australia. These documents did not fi t within the scope of the current research. Such documents will be the 
focus of future research and publications undertaken by the WA Tobacco Document Searching Program.
The industry documents made available to the public through the MSA off er only a fragmentary coverage of 
the international tobacco industry’s interest in WA. It is important to note that the documents available on the 
online document archives represent only those documents uncovered through the ‘discovery’ process in US 
litigation.17 The available documents are likely to be an unrepresentative sample of all documents ever produced 
by the tobacco industry. It is further likely that the documents relevant to WA retrieved in this research represent 
only a fraction of the history of tobacco industry correspondence regarding WA. Some insights provided by 
the documents cannot be followed or further clarifi ed as related documents may not be available. In some 
circumstances, questions are raised which cannot be answered from the available documents. 
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Review of monograph aim
This monograph set out to document the extent to which the international tobacco industry has been interested 
in WA and why. The industry documents provide many insights into this. 
The quantity and frequency of documents regarding WA suggest that the industry’s interest in WA is extensive. 
The available documents also suggest that industry interest has peaked at certain times (e.g., 1983) in line with 
developments such as legislative proposals, changes in government, establishment of health organisations and 
campaigns etc. 
The documents also provide information as to why the international tobacco industry has been interested 
specifi cally in WA. In order to maintain profi ts and gains, tobacco industry executives protect the interests of their 
companies (including shareholders) by monitoring regular updates provided by their Australian counterparts and 
ensuring that the Australian representatives are doing everything they can to thwart eff ective tobacco control 
measures. The monitoring of WA media can be understood as being an important aspect of global monitoring 
processes and day-to-day standard activities the tobacco industry engage in. 
The tobacco industry have recognised WA as a leading region for tobacco control and have thus directed 
corresponding attention to WA to address the tobacco control movement. 
A signifi cant body of literature documents strategies implemented by the tobacco industry and their 
allies to delay tobacco control measures or encourage incremental introduction as opposed to immediate 
implementations.9, 149, 209, 328 The internal documents retrieved and critiqued in this report provide local evidence 
that the tobacco industry have implemented similar strategies and campaigns in WA to obstruct tobacco control 
initiatives, with the support and full awareness of the international tobacco industry. Internal documents provide 
evidence that international and Australian tobacco company representatives have manipulated the policy process 
in WA by introducing strategies to lobby the WA government, infl uence and manipulate the public through well-
funded mass media campaigns, and exploit recipients of tobacco industry funding by encouraging them to act 
as third parties to lobby the public and government with the industry’s agenda. The documents in this report 
illustrate that the tobacco industry’s activities in WA have had the approval, support and infl uence of some of the 
most senior international tobacco industry executives. 
The documents referring to WA also refl ect the speed at which tobacco industry-related information travelled 
between industry representatives in distant locations. For example, the information related to the 1998 indoor 
smoking ban, including an article in The West Australian, travelled from Perth to London and onto New York in the 
same day. This demonstrates the importance of the information to the tobacco industry and their eagerness to act 
on it without delay. 
Support for tobacco control in WA
The majority of the WA public have long supported tobacco control measures.4, 329, 330 Survey results consistently 
illustrate that the public have embraced tobacco control measures, allowed for their smooth implementation and 
often assisted eff ective regulation (e.g., indoor smoking bans, restaurant and alfresco smoking bans).4, 329, 330 
Today, when a federal ban on tobacco advertising in print media has been in place since December 1991122 and 
tobacco sponsorship in WA has been replaced since February 1992122, it is clear that the removal of tobacco 
sponsorship and the banning of tobacco advertising did not bring about the disaster for sport and employment 
the industry wanted the public to anticipate. However, the tobacco industry and their allies continue to use such 
dramatic arguments when opposing tobacco control measures.
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WA’s future in tobacco control
While tobacco remains WA’s largest preventable cause of death and disease,331 there will be both need and scope 
for further action to reduce smoking. This will always entail countering of the global tobacco industry’s eff orts to 
promote smoking amongst all sectors of the community of whatever ages. It is to be hoped that the information 
provided in this monograph will help all concerned in tobacco control to learn from the industry’s concerns 
and activities of the past, and will help to guide future tobacco control activity. The information is intended to 
reinforce the need for advocates to remain vigilant, never to underestimate industry resolve or infl uence and to 
recognise that the shared vision of a healthy, smoke-free WA requires sustained eff ort.
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Appendix A: Index of Organisations
Table 4. Index of Organisation Names and Roles Mentioned In Text
Note. Health organisations are highlighted.
Name Description
Action on Smoking and Health Non-government, non-profi t organisation. Aims to reduce tobacco caused 
disease through education, policy advice and information programs.332
Advertising Federation of 
Australia




Responsible for administering the Australian system of advertising self-
regulation.334 
Australian Thoracic Society Professional society of thoracic physicians, scientists and lung disease-
related healthcare workers which aims to prevent and cure respiratory 
disease.335
American Tobacco Company Cigarette manufacturer which was purchased by British American Tobacco 
in 1994.336
Associated Newsagents Industry organisation representing newsagents and newsagencies.337
Association for Research 
Into Substance Enjoyment/ 
Associates for Research into the 
Science of Enjoyment 
A group of academics and scientists founded in 1988. Aimed to show how 
everyday pleasures improve the quality of life.53, 338
Australian Council on Smoking 
and Health 
Non-government, non-profi t organisation. Aims to raise awareness of 
smoking and health issues.339
Australian Medical Association Represents the registered doctors and medical students of Australia.340
Australian Publishers Bureau Association of major Australian newspaper and magazine groups.341
British American Tobacco The world’s most international tobacco company. Based in London, UK.342
British American Tobacco 
Australia
Australian subsidiary company of London-based British American Tobacco. 
British American Tobacco 
Companies
Acronym used in reference to the larger conglomerate of companies BAT 
own.343
British American Tobacco 
United States
Tobacco holding company in the USA based in Louisville, Kentucky.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Company
Cigarette manufacturer with British American Tobacco as its parent 
company.336
Burswood International Resort 
Casino 
WA’s only casino.
Campbell-Johnson Limited British public aff airs fi rm contracted by BAT; compiled a “daily synopsis of 
press, radio and television coverage”.41
Cancer Council WA (formerly 
named the Cancer Foundation 
of WA)
Non-government, non-profi t organisation. Advocate and act on cancer 
issues.344
Clayton Utz Australian law fi rm which consulted for the tobacco industry.
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Name Description
Community Recreation Council 
of WA
Government department which emphasised physical activity and 
community education between 1973 and 1979. Later titled the Department 
of Sport and Recreation.345
Confederation of Major 
Participant and Spectator 
Sports
Tobacco industry front group disguised as a group of Western Australian 
sporting bodies founded in 1983.92 
Croll Communications Pty Ltd. Produced media monitoring service titled Croll’s Monitoring Australia.27
Federated Tobacco Workers A workers union established to protect the pay and conditions of tobacco 
industry workers.346
Freedom Organisation for 
the Right to Enjoy Smoking 
Tobacco
Smokers’ rights group funded by the tobacco industry.347
Imperial Tobacco Cigarette manufacturer established a presence in Australia in 1999 to market 
brands divested from Rothmans Holdings and W.D & H.O Wills Ltd, which 
had merged to form BATA.348
Independent Retailers 
Association
Represents the interests of Australian independent retailers and assists in 
the protection of small business retailers.349
Institute for Child Health 
Research
Multidisciplinary research institute which aims to improve and promote the 
health and well-being of children.350
International Committee on 
Smoking Issues 
Established in the 1970s by multinational tobacco companies to address the 
declining social acceptability of smoking. Renamed INFOTAB in 1981.11
Infomat UK-based customised information service founded in 1981 providing daily 
or weekly media summaries. Contracted with BAT.257 
International Tobacco 
Information Center
Originally named ICOSI. Set up as a “forum for exchange of views and 
information on international tobacco issues”.11, 12
Lorillard US Cigarette manufacturer.351
Lovell White Durrant International law fi rm contracted with BAT. Produced media monitoring 
publications (e.g., ‘Tobacco Bulletin’).352
Media Monitors Australia Media intelligence company founded in 1982 as a press clipping service.353
National Heart Foundation Non-government, non-profi t organisation. Aims to reduce heart disease 
through advocacy, research and education.354
National Health and Medical 
Research Council
Australian organisation supporting health and medical research.355
National Manufacturers 
Association 
Advocate a pro-manufacturing agenda by shaping a US legislative and 
regulatory environment conducive to US economic growth.356
NJP News Express Media monitoring service of company Neville Jeff ress/Pidler Pty. Ltd. 
Changed name to Media Monitors Australia.23
Outdoor Advertising 
Association
Lobby group representing Australian outdoor media display companies and 
production facilities. Changed name to Outdoor Media Association Inc. in 
2005.357
Philip Morris Asia/Pacifi c Regional headquarters for PMI located in Hong Kong.358
Philip Morris (Australia) Limited Established in 1954 as the fi rst overseas affi  liate of PMI.359 Wholly-owned 
subsidiary of PM Companies Inc.360
Philip Morris Companies Inc. Parent company of Kraft Foods Inc., Philip Morris International Inc. and Philip 
Morris USA Inc. Changed name to Altria Group Inc. in 2003.361
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Name Description
Philip Morris International International tobacco company with headquarters in New York.361
Philip Morris Incorporated Wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria Group. Manufacture and market tobacco 
products in the US.362
Philip Morris Management 
Corporation
Parent company of PM USA now known as Altria Corporate Services Inc. 
Based in New York.361
Price Waterhouse Provides assurance, business advisory and taxation services to public 
and private clients. Merged with Coopers & Lybrand in 1998 to create 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.363
Rehame Australia Monitoring 
Services Pty Ltd
Media monitoring service which provided monitoring reports to PML. 
Acquired by Media Monitors in 2006.31 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Cigarette manufacturer based in the US. Indirect wholly owned subsidiary of 
Reynolds American Inc.364
Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) 
Ltd
A tobacco company in the Rothmans Holdings Limited Group.365
Roy Morgan Research Centre Market research and public opinion polling company.366
Shook, Hardy & Bacon Law fi rm based in Kansas City, Missouri contracted by PM. Distributed media 
and issues summaries.11
Sports Federation of Victoria Non-government organisation representing Victoria’s sport and active 
recreation sector. Also known as VicSport.367
Spring O’Brien Communications analysis and issue management organisation providing 
advertising and public relations services.219 
Tobacco Advisory Council A UK tobacco industry trade and lobbying group which operated in a similar 
manner to the Tobacco Institute in the US and Australia.368
Tobacco Documentation Center Succeeded INFOTAB from 1992 as a clearinghouse for tobacco industry 
information.369
Tobacco Information Centre Inc A library of tobacco and smoking-related information established by 
Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd, WD & HO Wills (Australia) Ltd and PML 
in December 1996.370
Tobacco Institute of Australia Organisation set up to represent joint tobacco industry interests in 
Australia.11
Tobacco Merchants Association A tobacco trade association providing supporting companies with reports of 
information concerning the global tobacco industry.371
US Tobacco Institute Trade and lobbying association for the US tobacco industry.372
W.D & H.O Wills Ltd. Australian tobacco company. Subsidiary of Amatil until 1989 when it came 
under the control of BAT.373
Western Australian Darts 
Council
Governing body for darts in WA.374
Western Australian Department 
of Occupational Health, Safety 
and Welfare 
WA government department with the objectives of minimising risks from 
hazards in the workplace and providing occupational welfare services. 
Replaced by Worksafe WA in 1996.375
Western Australian Greyhounds 
Racing Association
Manages greyhound racing tracks in WA.376
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Name Description
Western Australian Health 
Promotion Foundation, 
Healthway
Established as part of the WA Tobacco Control Act 1990. Provides grants 
and sponsorship to health and research organisations, sport, arts, racing 
and community groups to encourage healthy lifestyles and advance health 
promotion programs.377
Western Australian Hotels 
Association
Organisation responsible for representing the interests of the Western 
Australian hotel and hospitality industry.378
Western Australian Trades & 
Labour Council
WA’s peak trade union body. Changed name to UnionsWA in 2000.379
Western Australian Trotting 
Association
Organisation responsible for racing activities at WA harness racing venues.380
“We are still not yet out 
of  the woods in W.A.”:
Western Australia and the 
international tobacco industry
WA Tobacco Document Searching Program
Julia Staff ord,  Laura Bond 
and Mike Daube
